sciences, is always the history of nature,--the series of facts, which, as we know, can be distinguished only in an empirical manner from the history of man, and which along with this constitutes _History_ without genitive or adjective; history, which cannot even be strictly called history of the spirit, for the Spirit is, itself, History. [Footnote 1: See my _Essay on Hegel,_ chap. ix. (_What is living, etc., of Hegel,_ tr. D. Ainslie).] IV MYTHOLOGISM [Sidenote: _Rupture of the unity of the synthesis a priori. Mythologism._] When by the severance of subject from predicate, of history from philosophy, the mutilated subject is given as predicate, mutilated history as philosophy, and consequently a false predicate is posited, which predicate is an abstract subject and therefore mere representation; when this happens, there occurs the opposite error to that which we have just particularly examined. That was called philosophism; this might be called historicism; but since this last term has usually been employed to indicate a form of positivism, it will be more convenient to call it _mythologism._ The process of this error (somewhat abstruse in the way that we have stated it) becomes clear at once in virtue of the name that has been assigned to it. Every one has examples of myths present in his memory. Let us take the myths of Uranus and Gæa, of the seven days of creation, of the earthly Paradise, and of Prometheus, of Danaë, or of Niobe. Every one is ready to say of a scientific theory which introduces causes not demonstrable either in the experience or in thought, that it is not theory, but mythology, not concept, but myth. [Sidenote: _Essence of the myth._]