Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept — John Shaqi
Logic as the Science of the Pure ConceptCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept
Croce, Benedetto
Logic
The concept has the character of _expressivity;_ that is to say, it is
a cognitive product, and, therefore, expressed or spoken, not a mute
act of the spirit, as is a practical act. If we wish to submit the
effective possession of a concept to a first test, we can employ the
experiment which was advised on a previous occasion:--whoever asserts
that he possesses a concept, should be invited to expound it in words,
and with other means of expression (graphic symbols and the like). If
he refuse to do so, and say that his concept is so profound that words
cannot avail to render it, we can be sure, either that he is under the
illusion of possessing a concept, when he possesses only turbid fancies
and morsels of ideas; or that he has a presentiment of the profound
concept, that it is in process of formation, and will be, but is not
yet, possessed. Each of us knows that when he finds himself in the
meditative depth of the internal battle, of that true _agony_ (because
it is the death of one life and the birth of another), which is the
discovery of a concept, he can certainly talk of the state of his soul,
of his hopes and fears, of the rays that enlighten and of the shadows
that invade him; but he cannot yet communicate his concept, which is
not as yet, because it is not yet expressible.
[Sidenote: _Universality._]
If this character of expressivity be common to the concept and to the
representation, its _universality_ is peculiar to the concept; that is
to say, its transcendence in relation to the single representations, so
that no single representation and no number of them can be equivalent
to the concept. There is no middle term between the individual and
the universal: either there is the single or there is the whole, into
which that single enters with all the singles. A concept which has been
proved not universal, is, by that very fact, confuted as a concept.
Our philosophical confutations do not proceed otherwise. Sociology,
for instance, asserts the concept of _Society,_ as a rigorous concept
and principle of science; and the criticism of Sociology proves that
the concept of society is not universal, but individual, and is
related to the groupings of certain beings which representation has
placed before the sociologist, and which he has arbitrarily isolated
from other complexes of beings that representation also placed or
could place before him. The theory of tragedy postulates the concept
of the _tragic,_ and from it deduces certain necessary essentials
of tragedy; and the criticism of literary classes demonstrates that
the tragic is not a concept, but a roughly defined group of artistic
representations, which have certain external likenesses in common; and,
therefore, that it cannot serve as foundation for any theory. On the
other hand, to establish a universality, which at first was wanting,
is the glory of truly scientific thought; hence we give the name of
discoverers to those who bring to light connections of representations
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