[Sidenote: _Æsthetic and Æsthetic-logical expressions or expressions of the concept; propositions and judgments._] Owing to the incarnation of the concept or logic in expression and language, language is quite full of logical elements; hence people are often led astray into affirming (we have already made clear the erroneousness[2] of this) that language is a logical function. Water might as well be called wine, because wine has been poured into the water. But language as language or as simple æsthetic fact is one thing, and language as expression of logical thought is another, for in this case, certainly, language remains always language and subject to the law of language, but is also more than language. If the first be termed simple expression, _logos seimantikos,_ as Aristotle said, or _judicium æstheticum sive sensitivum,_ according to the school of Baumgarten, the second must on the contrary be called affirmation, _logos apophantikos, judicium logicum_ or _æsthetico-logicum._ To this same issue we can reduce, if we understand it properly, the distinction between _proposition_ and _judgment,_ for they are only distinguishable in so far as it is assumed that the second form is dominated by the concept, whereas the first is given as free of such domination. But we should seek in vain for facts in proof of expressions belonging to either form, because we cannot furnish them without making the proviso that we understand them in the meaning of one or other of the two forms. Taken by themselves, any verbal expressions which we adduce or can adduce as proofs are indeterminate and therefore of many meanings. "Love is life" can be the saying of a poet who notes an impression with which his soul is agitated and marks it with fervour and solemnity; or it can be, equally, the logical affirmation of some one philosophizing on the essence of life. "Clear, fresh, and sweet waters," when uttered by Petrarch, is an æsthetic proposition; but the same words become a logical judgment when, for example, they answer the question as to which is the most celebrated love song of Petrarch, or pseudological when applied by a naturalist to the substance water. A word no longer has meaning, or--what amounts to the same thing--has no definite meaning, when it is abstracted from the circumstances, the implications, the emphasis, and the gesture with which it has been thought, animated, and pronounced. Nevertheless, forgetfulness of this elementary hermeneutic canon, by which a word is a word only on the soil that has produced it and to which it must be restored, has been in Logic the cause of interminable disputes as to the logical nature of this or that verbal phrase, separated from the whole to which it belonged and rendered abstract. It would be much less equivocal to adduce such poems as _I Sepolcri,_ or the song _A Silvia,_ as documents of æsthetic propositions, and philosophical treatises (for examples, the _Metaphysics_ or the _Analytics_) as documents of