æsthetic-logical judgments or propositions. But here, too, we should need to add: "poetry considered as poetry," and "philosophy considered as philosophy," since it is clear that a poem is prose in the soul of him who reflects upon it, and prose is poetry in the soul of a writer vibrating with enthusiasm and emotion in the act of composition. Facts do not constitute proofs in philosophy, save when they are interpreted through the medium of philosophy; and then, too, they become mere _examples,_ which aid in fixing the attention upon what is being demonstrated. [Sidenote: _Surpassing of the dualism of thought and language._] The relation between language and thought, conceived as we have conceived it, does not admit the criticism that it creates an insuperable dualism, though that criticism was justly aimed at those who set the two concepts side by side and parallel with one another. In that case the sole means that remained of obtaining unity was to present language as an acoustic fact and declare thought to be the unique psychic reality, and language the physical side of the psychophysical nexus. But no one will henceforth wish to repeat the blasphemy that language (the synonym of fancy and poetry) is nothing but a physical-acoustic fact and merely adherent to thought. We have in the two forms, notwithstanding their clear distinction, not parallelism and dualism, but an organic relation of connection in distinction,--the first form being implied in the second, the second crystallized into the first,--precisely in conformity with that rhythmical movement of the concepts which we have already discussed. And thus, too, when asked if the _prius_ of Logic be the concept or the judgment, we must reply that the judgment, understood as an æsthetic proposition, is certainly a _prius;_ but understood as a logical judgment, it is neither a _prius_ nor a _posterius_ in relation to the concept, since it is the concept itself in its effectuality. [Sidenote: _The logical judgment as definition._]