Disputes of materialistic origin--The concept as value--Realism and nominalism--Critique of both--True realism--Resolution of other difficulties as to the genesis of concepts--Disputes arising from the neglected distinction between empirical and abstract concepts--Intersection of the various disputes--Other logical disputes--Representative accompaniment of the concept--Concept of the thing and concept of the individual--Reasons, laws and causes--Intellect and Reason--The abstract reason and its practical nature--The synthesis of theoretical and practical and intellectual intuition--Uniqueness of thought. V CRITIQUE OF THE DIVISIONS OF THE CONCEPTS AND THEORY OF DISTINCTION AND DEFINITION The pseudoconcepts, not a subdivision of the concept--Obscurity, clearness and distinction, not subdivisions of the concept--Inexistence of subdivisions of the concept as logical form--Distinctions of the concepts not logical, but real--Multiplicity of the concepts; and logical difficulty arising therefrom. Necessity of overcoming it--Impossibility of eliminating it--Unity as distinction--Inadequacy of the numerical concept of the multiple--Relation of distincts as ideal history--Distinction between ideal history and real history--Ideal distinction and abstract distinction--Other usual distinctions of the concept, and their significance--Identical, unequal, primitive and derived concepts, etc.--Universal, particular and singular. Comprehension and extension--Logical definition--Unity-distinction as a circle--Distinction in the pseudoconcepts--Subordination and co-ordination of empirical concepts--Definition in empirical concepts, and forms of the concept--The series in abstract concepts. VI OPPOSITION AND LOGICAL PRINCIPLES Opposite or contradictory concepts--Their diversity from distincts --Confirmation of this afforded by empirical Logic--Difficulty arising from the double type of concepts, opposite and distinct--Nature of opposites; and their identity, when they are distinguished, with distincts--Impossibility of distinguishing one opposite from another, as concept from concept--The dialectic--Opposites are not concepts, but the unique concept itself--Affirmation and negation--The principle of identity and contradiction; true meaning, and false interpretation of it--Another false interpretation: contrast with the principle of opposition. False application of this principle also--Errors of the dialectic applied to the relation of distincts--Its reduction to the absurd--The improper form of logical principles or laws--The principle of sufficient reason. SECOND SECTION INDIVIDUAL JUDGMENT I THE CONCEPT AND THE VERBAL FORM. THE DEFINITIVE JUDGMENT