[Sidenote: _The theories of the concept and of the judgment._] The three fundamental forms have been reduced by some logicians to two, by others; amplified to four or to five, by adding to them the perceptive form or the definitive and systematic form. These restrictions and amplifications have always encountered resistance, because it was justly felt that in this way one form of empiricism was being mingled with another: the verbal form with empirical distinctions drawn from other presuppositions. But in determining in particular the three fundamental forms, formalist Logic has not been able to restrict itself to the mere distinction of words and propositions, artificially placed in relation with the pure concept; but has been obliged to draw from other sources. The concepts are variously classified, sometimes from the verbal point of view, as _identical, equivalent, equivocal, anonymous_ and _synonymous_; sometimes from the logical point of view, as _distinct, disparate, contrary_ or _contradictory_; sometimes from the psychological point of view, as _incomplete_ and _complete, obscure_ and _clear,_ the concepts further always being understood as names, so that, for example, distinct concepts are indifferently philosophically distinct concepts, and empirically distinct concepts; and the contraries are both the philosophical contraries and those empirically so-called. The same has occurred in the classification of judgments where sometimes the determinations of the concept are taken as foundation and the judgments distinguished as _universal particular_ and _individual;_ sometimes the intrinsic dialectic nature of the concept, and they are distinguished as _affirmative, negative_ and _indeterminate_ or _infinite_; sometimes the stages passed through in the search for truth, and they are distinguished into _categorical, hypothetical_ and _disjunctive,_ or _apodeictic, assertory_ and _problematic._ And these forms have further always been understood verbally. "Universality" is the "totality" empirically designated by the word, and not true universality; and "individuality," on the contrary, is not only the individuality of the representation, but also the single particularity of the distinct concept; "affirmative" is differentiated from "negative" by accidental grammatical form, and not because that unique act which is thought, at once affirmation and negation (as the will is both love and hatred) can be truly divided. [Sidenote: _The theory of the syllogism._]