Logic as the Science of the Pure ConceptCroce, Benedetto
Philosophy
Logic as the Science of the Pure Concept
Croce, Benedetto
Logic
The classification of syllogisms, founded exactly upon the empirical
conception of the judgment as the copulation of a _subject_ and a
_predicate_ affords a suitable parallel to this method of treatment of
the judgment; subject and predicate being understood in an empirical
and grammatical manner, whence they are also discovered in those
verbal affirmations, in which they are not distinct, because they are
identical, as in the case of the judgment of definition. For empirical
Logic, in the judgment: "The will is the practical form of the spirit,"
"will" is subject and "practical form" predicate in the same way as in
"Peter is a man," "Peter" is subject, and "man" predicate. From the
distinction between subject and predicate, arise the four _figures_
of the syllogism; the criterion being the position of the middle term
in the two premisses of the three propositions of which the syllogism
is formed. If the middle term be subject in the first premiss and
predicate in the second, we have the first figure; if it be predicate
in both, the second; if it be subject in both, the third; if it be
predicate in the first and subject in the second, the fourth figure
("_sub-prae,_ turn _prae-prae,_ turn _sub-sub,_ turn _prae-sub")._
But in order to deduce the moods of each figure recourse is then had
to another criterion, indeed to two other criteria; that is, to the
empirical distinctions of judgments into universal and particular, and
into affirmative and negative, with the four consequent determinations
into universal-affirmative judgments (A), universal-negative (E),
particular-affirmative (I), and particular-negative (O). Thus, in the
first figure, two universal affirmative premisses constitute the first
mood, and the conclusion is universal affirmative _(Barbara)_; two
premisses, both universal, but one affirmative and the other negative,
constitute the second, and the conclusion is universal negative
_(celarent)_; two premisses, one universal affirmative and the other
particular affirmative, constitute the third mood, and the conclusion
is particular affirmative _(darii);_ two premisses, one universal
negative and one particular affirmative, constitute the fourth mood,
and the conclusion is particular negative _(ferio)._ And so on.
[Sidenote: _Spontaneous reductions to the absurd of formal Logic._]
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