Luise, Queen, consort of Frederick William III, King of Prussia, 1776-1810; Queens -- Germany -- Prussia -- Biography
Not until her six weeks’ stay at the sanatorium was ended did she learn,
on returning to Berlin, that war had been determined upon. Concessions
had become useless, for Napoleon already treated Prussia as a vassal. On
August 9 the King had given orders for the mobilization of the entire
army. Negotiations were under way with Austria, Russia, and England in
order to effect an understanding. But Austria was too much weakened,
Russia too far away, and even England could not give immediate
assistance. So Prussia remained isolated, and its shortsightedness and
slothfulness during the previous year brought forth sad fruit. One more
attempt was made to conciliate Napoleon. He declared that he would
attack Prussia with all his forces before Russia could come to its
assistance, but that all might still be well, if Prussia would
immediately disarm. What Napoleon expected of the King when he was
disarmed was clear to everybody, and to no one more so than to the
Queen. When, on her return, she learned what had been determined upon as
consistent with the honor and well-being of the fatherland, she
advocated the war, highly as she valued peace. The arch-enemy of Prussia
learned this and made use of it by charging that she instigated the war.
The newspapers which he controlled began rude attacks upon this splendid
woman in order to lower her in the eyes of her people.
Had she suspected the real condition of the army, a state of affairs
which the King only began to realize when war was at hand, she might
have counselled otherwise. But her high opinion of the army of Frederick
the Great was confirmed by the confidence of its officers. General
Rüchel, who had retaken Frankfort from the French, was so fatuous as to
declare that the Prussian army had plenty of field-marshals equal to
General Bonaparte. A colonel deplored the fact that the heroic army of
the great Frederick should be furnished with cannon, rifles, and swords
for the battle with the French, instead of clubs with which “to beat
back these dogs.” “Why do we need fortifications?” asked another. “Our
fortress is the army, behind whose invincible ranks we can defy the
enemy.” Even a few days before the battle, when the Prussian army was
virtually surrounded, a Prussian general staff officer declared that the
enemy was already cut off by their clever strategy and Napoleon “as
certainly ours as if we already had him in this hat.” But what was the
real state of affairs?
The fortresses were in bad condition, the commanders were weak dotards,
the strategetical points unoccupied, so that in case of retreat the road
to the capital was open to the enemy. The superior officers were old and
graduates of Frederick’s antiquated school of war, and the younger ones
full of patrician insolence. The army itself was not in training, and
consisted principally of recruited foreigners. The commander-in-chief
was superannuated.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account