Then, as I have said, there is another reason why we think of conscience as our highest faculty. That is, that it acts instinctively. It has a sensitiveness of feeling towards questions of right and wrong, and of truth and error. This seems to me to be a higher faculty than mere reason. It seems to ally conscience more closely with the divine. We cannot think of God arriving at conclusions by reasoning. He is conscious of the truth without any intermediate process of reasoning. It is said of Sir Isaac Newton that he perceived at a glance the truth of many propositions that had to be tediously reasoned out step by step by inferior minds. We recognize at once the superiority of such an order of mind; and in the realm of morals it is such a faculty with which conscience is endowed. Thus in both respects that have been indicated, freewill seems to occupy a lower plane. For one thing it has largely to do with matters in a lower realm. It concerns itself, not chiefly with higher questions, but often with matters of the most trifling character. Its daily operation is mainly with the commonplace. And besides, it has not the gift of intuition but of reason, and often of conflicting reason. For such reasons as these freewill--important as it is--must be conceived as a lower faculty than that of conscience. Because conscience operates solely in a higher realm, and because its operations are of a higher quality, I think of it as a superior function of the soul. If there is too much theory here, consider the matter for a moment in its practical aspect. We often see that one strong will can dominate a weaker one, without in the least impairing its freedom. There is no doubt that the weaker will is as free as ever. It freely yields to the influence of the stronger will. And it may yield intelligently. It is easy to conceive that influences may be brought to bear on it by which it is captured, without losing a particle of its freedom. THE WORST OF MANKIND. We may reasonably conceive, then, of Christ acting on the most incorrigible of mankind, and entirely capturing them without in the least depriving them of freewill. What influences He may bring to bear upon them, who can say? What unfoldings of eternal love He may reveal are impossible to be imagined. We can thus believe that the worst of mankind might be captured and redeemed. I appeal to the capture of Saul of Tarsus as an example of such a possibility. What a door of hope is opened here for our lost race! * * * * *