The unity of matter in question, as designed for the purposes of education, is prescribed on the strength of a double maxim; first, that the sifting of many opinions, by the varied and multiplied activity of many minds, leaves a residue of matter, quite solid enough to support a compact and reliable system of teaching; secondly, that, in point of fact, such matter, which I have called "a residue," is nothing else than the basis of truth, divine and eternal; since, in clearing away the ground, all the criteria of each order, the natural and supernatural, have been faithfully and assiduously regarded. Hereupon, intellectual concord is felt to be the result in the entire teaching body. Of this concord the critics say, that it is the condition and cause of a wider and profounder learning in the faculties at large. Each Professor is engaged, "not in tilling some patch of his own, but in contributing his industry to the general field of all." Where is the gain, they ask, "if what one establishes, another upsets, not as if he had always excogitated something better, but for fear he should be thought to profit by the fruits of another's genius? Sometimes it really makes no difference whether one or other tenet is held; but, if we are bent on receiving no support from another, then, for all our labor, we get no other fruit but dissension."[280] I presume there is not a university anywhere but will bear witness, by its internal history, to the justice of this remark. Nor do these Fathers apprehend that reputation for real science will suffer by such concord, since "reputation for science does not come from opinions contradicting one another, but from their having agreed." They express no lofty esteem for the notoriety which may be had, by fighting no less with friends than with foes, and reserving admiration for only what is at a respectable distance, and "turning up one's nose at what is near."[281] This pungent remark seems to be a new and pedagogical application of the old proverb, _Nihil vicinia molestius_, "Nothing more annoying than one's neighbors!" They hold that, upon a basis of concord, there is always room and liberty for the exercise of talent; first, in those questions which are manifestly indifferent; secondly, in thinking out new distinctions and reasons, whereby truths already certain may be made more secure still; thirdly, in attacking the same, either when publicly disputing, or also when actually teaching, if what they acutely urge against a position, they more acutely refute; fourthly, in proposing new opinions and questions, but after they have sought the approval of the responsible authorities, lest the labor be spent amiss. The most learned men have always been persuaded that there is more subtlety shown, more applause merited and comfort enjoyed, in pursuing the lines of approved and received thought, than in a general license and novelty of opinion.[282] But these critics throw out an idea of theirs, which quite possibly will