The explanation of Romans iii.[660] begins with a general assault on the “proud ‘spirituals’ in the Church, with their great and many works,” the heading chosen being that “Justification does not require works of the law, but true faith which performs works of faith.” The works of these “spirituals” are not works of faith, but works of the law, for as they are proud and stiff-necked they “do not believe in the precepts and counsels of those who speak to them of salvation.” Christ Himself speaks in the latter, and to refuse to believe them in any one particular is to deny faith in Him altogether (“_fides consistit in indivisibili_”); for the same reason the heretics, if they deny only one article of the faith, really deny the faith as a whole. In a word, these proud folk “lose the whole faith, thanks merely to their stiffness” (“_periit tota fides propter unius sensus pertinaciam_”); so important is it to give way to truth whenever it approaches us in humility! Justification must therefore necessarily take place without the works which those people have in their mind. If a man cannot readily bear contradiction “he certainly cannot be saved; for there is no surer sign that our ideas, words and works are of God than contradiction [!]; everything that is of God must be rejected by man, as we see from the example of our Saviour, and, even if it be not of God, contradiction brings us still greater profit and preserves us from shipwreck.” In support of this perplexing doctrine there follow examples and quotations from the Bible, and finally this conclusion: “it is a safe path when we are reproved, cursed and blamed.” He does not seem to notice that this assertion provides a ground of excuse and defence for the so-called “proud ‘spirituals,’” for they, too, might argue that his contradiction gave a sanction to their conduct. Luther seems to have had only himself and his own interests in view when he brought forward these ideas, beginning with the extreme assertion that we must believe every word that a good man speaks; he apparently wished to insist on himself and his followers being given credence, and on their views—which were the views of faithful counsellors—being approved by the defenders of works, whether in his Order or outside of it. As he encountered contradiction, he immediately applied to his own case the very elastic principle, that opposition in religious matters is a guarantee of truth. This was a principle, we may mention, which he had made his own ever since his mystical days, and which at a later date and indeed till the end of his life, he repeatedly employed in the service of his cause during his struggle with the Church.