stopped before a thin line of infantry guarding the approaches to Hsin-minting, where Japanese supplies are stored sky-high. Had he known it, he was within an ace of picking up a number of distinguished British officers, besides newspaper correspondents, and a famous general whom the Emperor William has specially delighted to honour. But an inferior number of riflemen checked the advance, and no use was made of the mobility of the column, except to retire by a circuitous route.... So far as my information goes, the Russian cavalry west of Mukden never once took the offensive during the battle. Strapped up with rifle and bayonet, they are incapable of wielding the sword; their lances, except in the case of a small proportion of the Cossacks, have been left in Russia. So it was useless to contemplate old-fashioned cavalry work. But the Japanese communications were an easy mark, and it is one of the most singular features of Russian tactics that they did not avail themselves of so glaring an opportunity. Even as mounted infantry they should have been able to destroy Nogi’s communications. Yet they never made a single attempt at interference. “The deduction is obvious: either the training or arming must be at fault. When a mounted man dismounts he sacrifices his mobility to become a weak infantryman. The Russian cavalry has been trained to fight dismounted, and the result is that the Russians have divested themselves of the one arm which, many keen observers believe, might have availed to turn the tide in their favour. The battle of Mukden was a great defeat, though not an overwhelming disaster. At one period the result hung in the balance, and it is no wild statement to say that if the Russian cavalry had been trained and armed in orthodox cavalry fashion, and handled in a manner consistent with cavalry tradition, Mukden would have proved a drawn battle. It is my firm belief--a belief shared with many others more competent to judge--that if French, with 10,000 British cavalry, had been given a free hand early in the war on the Russian side, there would have been no necessity for Kuropatkin to retire from his strong position at Liao-yang, and I have no less hesitation in saying that if the same able commander, with such a cavalry force as I have mentioned, had been attached to the Japanese side at Liao-yang or at Mukden, there would be no Russian army in Manchuria to-day. _En passant_ it may be remarked that if the Japanese cavalry had been capable of pursuit at Mukden, it would have proved a terrible thorn in the already bleeding Russian side. As it was, the Japanese were out-numbered and hence completely ineffective.”