We will now suppose a case where the enemy takes up a defensive position and the contact squadron has to force its way through. The squadron leader’s method of attack must entirely depend on the strength of the position, the force holding it, and the natural features of the country in the immediate vicinity; and on his plan of attack must depend the details of the action of the machine guns. The general principles governing their employment will remain the same, however much they may vary in the method of carrying out: the first is to supplement the rifle fire of the squadron so as to enable as many men as possible to remain mounted, while holding the enemy to his position; and the second is to gain superiority of fire for the squadron at the time and place selected by the squadron leader. We will suppose the position to be strong and the enemy to possess machine guns, and that the squadron leader’s plan is to hold the enemy to his position by a vigorous frontal attack, while he turns the weaker flank. To do this he may decide to use his guns for the containing attack supported by a troop, or to use his squadron for the containing attack and his guns to turn the flank. Having machine guns in position against him, it might be advisable to choose the latter course, because machine guns are less effective against a skirmishing line of attackers, while his own machine guns are more effective if they can gain the flank or rear of the enemy’s position and thus enfilade them, and any movement of mounted troops to repulse the turning movement, or take their attackers in flank, will afford the machine guns an opportunity for decisive fire action. Should the machine guns or one of them succeed in stalking the led horses of the enemy, their action will probably be decisive, as nothing affords a machine gun such an easy and effective target as the horses of a dismounted squadron, while the effect of fire on them is to render the squadron immobile and to place them out of action as cavalry altogether.