Magna Carta, and Other AddressesGuthrie, William D. (William Dameron)
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Magna Carta, and Other Addresses
Guthrie, William D. (William Dameron)
Constitutional law -- United States
We should then have government by the judiciary with a vengeance. Our
constitutional system would be no longer reasonably fixed and stable,
no longer regulated by the justice of necessary general rules, but
would be subject to constant uncertainty and change as judges might
think the moral atmosphere of the moment or the will or opinion or
interests of the majority required. It would, of course, be better to
have no constitutional restraints at all, and to vest supreme power
and corresponding responsibility in the legislative branch of our
government. It is of the essence of judicial power that judges in
deciding cases shall be bound by principles, rules and precedents, that
they shall not be permitted to exercise arbitrary discretion, and that
they shall be required to give reasons for their decisions. A court
bound by no rules or principles at all would not be exercising judicial
power as we understand that term. If we were to vest in legislatures
or courts the discretion to obey or disobey constitutional restraints
according as the prevailing moral or political sentiment might seem
to dictate, we would at once deprive such restraints of all practical
force and effect, and would have a constitution only in name and form
and not in substance. As the late Chief Justice Fuller, _clarum et
venerabile nomen_, so well said in the Lottery case, "our form of
government may remain notwithstanding legislation or decision, but, as
long ago observed, it is with governments as with religions, the form
may survive the substance of the faith."[11]
The limited time at my disposal compels me to confine this address
to the aspect of constitutional morality which is presented by the
criticism of the courts for refusing to enforce unconstitutional
statutes. This seems to me to be the most dangerous of all the lines
of attack. I regret that I have not time to deal with other important
aspects of my subject, such as the movement for the recall of judges
and judicial decisions, the agitation for the initiative and the
referendum, and the growing practice on the part of legislatures and
executives of abandoning the consideration of constitutional questions
and leaving this duty to the courts, thus casting upon the judges the
sole responsibility and frequently the unpopularity and even odium of
enforcing constitutional restraints.
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