Another current misrepresentation is that the Supreme Court of the United States in the Second Employers' Liability cases upheld as constitutional a statute of Congress identical with the statute held unconstitutional by the New York Court of Appeals in the Ives case. The people are being told that the New York courts hold the provision requiring due process of law in the fourteenth amendment to mean one thing, whilst the Supreme Court of the United States holds exactly the same provision in the fifth amendment to mean the contrary. But those who will take the trouble to read the two statutes will at once perceive that the act of Congress differs radically from the New York Workmen's Compensation Act. The act of Congress, although abolishing or restricting the rules as to fellow-servants' acts, assumption of risk and contributory negligence, imposes liability on common carriers by railroad only for "injury or death resulting in whole or in part from the _negligence_ of any of the officers, agents, or employees of such carrier, or by reason of any defect or insufficiency, _due to its negligence_, in its cars, engines, appliances, machinery, track, roadbed, works, boats, wharves, or other equipment." On the other hand, the New York statute created liability not in one dangerous employment, such as the business of common carrier by railroad, but in many other employments not necessarily dangerous, and wholly irrespective of negligence or fault on the part of the employer or any of his officers, agents, or employees. In fact, there is nothing in the New York decision or in the opinions of the judges which would invalidate a statute identical with the act of Congress if now enacted by the New York legislature. The Ives case, far from preventing such a statute, would be an authority in its support. I regret that we have not time to consider further these particular decisions. In my opinion they correctly and wisely applied established principles of constitutional law and constitutional justice and were morally right and just. I am now pleading for fairness and temperance in discussing the decisions of our courts and for the imperative necessity of founding these discussions upon the truth. Ambassador Bryce said in a recent address: "To counsel you to stick to facts is not to dissuade you from philosophical generalizations, but only to remind you ... that the generalizations must spring out of the facts, and without the facts are worthless." In other words, a regard for fact, which is but another term for truth, is or should be as indispensable in law and politics as it is in philosophy.