Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. MahanMahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Sea-power
Admiral Rosily’s approach was known in Cadiz some time before he could
arrive. It at first made little impression upon Villeneuve, who was not
expecting to be superseded. On the 11th of October, however, along with
the news that his successor had reached Madrid, there came to him a
rumor of the truth. His honor took alarm. If not allowed to remain
afloat, how remove the undeserved imputation of cowardice which he knew
had by some been attached to his name. He at once wrote to Decrès that
he would have been well content if permitted to continue with the fleet
in a subordinate capacity; and closed with the words, “I will sail
to-morrow, if circumstances favor.”
The wind next day was fair, and the combined fleets began to weigh. On
the 19th eight ships got clear of the harbor, and by ten A.M. Nelson,
far at sea, knew by signal that the long-expected movement had begun. He
at once made sail toward the Straits of Gibraltar to bar the entrance of
the Mediterranean to the allies. On the 20th, all the latter,
thirty-three ships-of-the-line accompanied by five frigates and two
brigs, were at sea, steering with a south-west wind to the northward and
westward to gain the offing needed before heading direct for the
Straits. That morning Nelson, for whom the wind had been fair, was lying
to off Cape Spartel to intercept the enemy; and learning from his
frigates that they were north of him, he stood in that direction to meet
them.
During the day the wind shifted to west, still fair for the British and
allowing the allies, by going about, to head south. It was still very
weak, so that the progress of the fleets was slow. During the night both
maneuvered; the allies to gain, the British to retain, the position they
wished. At daybreak of the 21st they were in presence, the French and
Spaniards steering south in five columns; of which the two to windward,
containing together twelve ships, constituted a detached squadron of
observation under Admiral Gravina. The remaining twenty-one formed the
main body, commanded by Villeneuve. Cape Trafalgar, from which the
battle took its name, was on the south-eastern horizon, ten or twelve
miles from the allies; and the British fleet was at the same distance
from them to the westward.
Soon after daylight Villeneuve signalled to form line of battle on the
starboard tack, on which they were then sailing, heading south. In
performing this evolution Gravina with his twelve ships took post in the
van of the allied fleet, his own flagship heading the column. It is
disputed between the French and Spaniards whether this step was taken by
Villeneuve’s order, or of Gravina’s own motion. In either case, these
twelve, by abandoning their central and windward position, sacrificed to
a great extent their power to reinforce any threatened part of the
order, and also unduly extended a line already too long. In the end,
instead of being a reserve well in hand, they became the helpless
victims of the British concentration.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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