Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. MahanMahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Sea-power
It matters little what may be the particular intentions now cherished by
the German government. The fact upon which the contemporary world needs
to fasten its attention is that it is confronted by the simple existence
of a power such as is that of the German Empire; reinforced necessarily
by that of Austria-Hungary, because, whatever her internal troubles and
external ambitions, Austria is bound to Germany by nearness, by inferior
power, and by interests, partly common to the two states, as surely as
the moon is bound to the earth and with it constitutes a single group in
the planetary system. Over against this stands for the moment a number
of states, Russia, Italy, France, Great Britain. The recent action of
Russia has demonstrated her international weakness, the internal causes
of which are evident even to the most careless observer. Italy still
belongs to the Triple Alliance, of which Germany and Austria are the
other members; but the inclination of Italy towards England, springing
from past sympathies, and as a state necessarily naval, because partly
insular, partly peninsular, is known, as is also her recent drawing
towards France as compared with former estrangement. Also, in the Balkan
regions and in the Adriatic Sea there is more than divergence between
the interest of Italy and the ambitions of Austria,—supported by
Germany,—as shown in the late annexations and their antecedents. An
Austrian journal, which fore-shadowed the annexations with singular
acumen, has written recently,[112] “We most urgently need a fleet so
strong that it can rule the Northern Adriatic basin,”—in which lies the
Italian Venice, as well as the Austrian Trieste,—“support the operations
of our land army, protect our chief commercial ports against hostile
maritime undertakings, and prevent us from being throttled at the Strait
of Otranto. To do this, the fleet must at least attain the approximate
strength of our probable enemy. If we lag behind in developing our naval
programme, Italy will so outrun us that we can never overtake her. Here
more than elsewhere to stand still is to recede; but to recede would be
to renounce the historical mission of Austria.” The Austrian
_Dreadnoughts_ are proceeding, and the above throws an interesting side
light upon the equipoise of the Triple Alliance. In the Algeciras
Conference, concerning the affairs of Morocco, Italy did not sustain
Germany; Austria only did so.
Analyzing thus the present international relations of Europe, we find on
the one side the recently constituted Triple _Entente_, France, Great
Britain, and Russia; on the other the Triple Alliance, Austria-Hungary,
Germany, and Italy, of thirty years’ standing. The sympathies of Italy,
as distinguished from the pressure of conditions upon her, and from her
formal association, are doubtful; and the essentials of the situation
seem to be summed up in the Triple _Entente_ opposed by the two
mid-Europe military monarchies.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account