Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. MahanMahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Sea-power
Never did sea power play a greater or a more decisive part than in the
contest which determined that the course of the world’s history would be
modified by the existence of one great nation, instead of several rival
States, in the North American continent. But while just pride is felt in
the well-earned glory of those days, and the greatness of the results
due to naval preponderance is admitted, Americans who understand the
facts should never fail to remind the overconfidence of their countrymen
that the South not only had no navy, not only was not a seafaring
people, but that also its population was not proportioned to the extent
of the sea-coast which it had to defend.
IV. _Number of Population._—After the consideration of the natural
conditions of a country should follow an examination of the
characteristics of its population as affecting the development of sea
power; and first among these will be taken, because of its relations to
the extent of the territory, which has just been discussed, the number
of the people who live in it. It has been said that in respect of
dimensions it is not merely the number of square miles, but the extent
and character of the sea-coast that is to be considered with reference
to sea power; and so, in point of population, it is not only the grand
total, but the number following the sea, or at least readily available
for employment on shipboard and for the creation of naval material, that
must be counted.
For example, formerly and up to the end of the great wars following the
French Revolution, the population of France was much greater than that
of England; but in respect of sea power in general, peaceful commerce as
well as military efficiency, France was much inferior to England. In the
matter of military efficiency this fact is the more remarkable because
at times, in point of military preparation at the outbreak of war,
France had the advantage; but she was not able to keep it. Thus in 1778,
when war broke out, France, through her maritime inscription, was able
to man at once fifty ships-of-the-line. England, on the contrary, by
reason of the dispersal over the globe of that very shipping on which
her naval strength so securely rested, had much trouble in manning forty
at home; but in 1782 she had one hundred and twenty in commission or
ready for commission, while France had never been able to exceed
seventy-one.
[The need is further shown, not only of a large seafaring population,
but of skilled mechanics and artisans to facilitate ship construction
and repair and supply capable recruits for the navy.—EDITOR.]
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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