Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan — John Shaqi
Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. MahanMahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Sea-power
Transfer now your attention back to the Danube when the scene of war is
in that region; as it was in 1796, and also frequently was during the
period of which we are now speaking.... You have seen before, that, if
there be war between Austria and France, as there so often was, the one
who held the Danube had a central position in the region. Holding means
possession by military power, which power can be used to the full
against the North or against the South—offensive power—far more easily
than the South and North can combine against him; because he is nearer
to each than either is to the other. (See map.) Should North wish to
send a big reinforcement to South, it cannot march across the part of
the Danube held, but must march around it above or below; exactly as, in
1640, reinforcements from Spain to the Rhine had, so to say, to march
around France. In such a march, on land, the reinforcement making it is
necessarily in a long column, because roads do not allow a great many
men to walk abreast. The road followed designates in fact the alignment
of the reinforcement from day to day; and because its advance
continually turns the side to the enemy, around whom it is moving, the
enemy’s position is said to flank the movement, constituting a
recognized danger. It makes no difference whether the line of march is
straight or curved; it is extension upon it that constitutes the danger,
because the line itself, being thin, is everywhere weak, liable to an
attack in force upon a relatively small part of its whole.
Communications are exposed, and the enemy has the interior line....
This is an illustration of the force of Napoleon’s saying, that “War is
a business of positions.” All this discussion turns on position; the
ordinary, semi-permanent, positions of Center, North, and South; or the
succession of positions occupied by the detachment on that line of
communications along which it moves. This illustrates the importance of
positions in a single instance, but is by no means exhaustive of that
importance. Fully to comprehend, it is necessary to study military and
naval history; bearing steadily in mind Napoleon’s saying, and the
definitions of central position, interior lines, and communications.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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