Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. MahanMahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Sea-power
An admiral may not be able to foresee such remote consequences of his
action, but he can safely adopt the principle expressed by Nelson, in
the instance just cited, after hearing his commander-in-chief say they
had done well enough: “If ten ships out of eleven were taken, I would
never call it well enough, if we were able to get at the eleventh.”
The relations between the fleets of Admirals Rozhestvensky and Togo
prior to their meeting off Tsushima bore no slight resemblance to those
between a pursued and a pursuing fleet. The Russian fleet, which had
started before the Port Arthur division succumbed, was placed by that
event in the position of a fleet which has suffered defeat so severe
that its first effort must be to escape into its own ports. This was so
obvious that many felt a retreat upon the Baltic was the only course
left open; but, failing that, Rozhestvensky argued that he should rush
on to Vladivostok at once, before the Japanese should get again into the
best condition to intercept him, by repairing their ships, cleaning the
bottoms, and refreshing the ships’ companies. Instead of so ordering,
the Russian government decided to hold him at Nossi-Bé (the north end of
Madagascar), pending a reinforcement to be sent under Admiral
Nebogatoff. Something is to be said for both views, in the abstract; but
considering that the reinforcement was heterogeneous and inferior in
character, that the Russian first aim was not battle but escape to
Vladivostok, and, especially, that the Japanese were particularly
anxious to obtain the use of delay for the very purpose Rozhestvensky
feared, it seems probable that he was right. In any event, he was
delayed at Nossi-Bé from January 9 to March 16; and afterwards at
Kamranh Bay in French Cochin-China, from April 14 to May 9, when
Nebogatoff joined. Allowing time for coaling and refitting, this
indicates a delay of sixty to seventy days; the actual time underway
from Nossi-Bé to Tsushima being only forty-five days. Thus, but for the
wait for Nebogatoff, the Russian division would have reached Tsushima
two months before it did, or about March 20.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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