Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. MahanMahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
History
Mahan on naval warfare : $b Selections from the writing of Rear Admiral Alfred T. Mahan
Mahan, A. T. (Alfred Thayer)
Naval art and science; Naval strategy; Sea-power
War alone could not entail it, if only war could be postponed until the
processes of circulation within and without the kingdom were established
and in vigorous operation. They did not exist when he took office; they
had to be both created and firmly rooted in order to withstand the blast
of war. Time was not given to accomplish this great work, nor did Louis
XIV support the schemes of his minister by turning the budding energies
of his docile and devoted subjects into paths favorable to it. So when
the great strain came upon the powers of the nation, instead of drawing
strength from every quarter and through many channels, and laying the
whole outside world under contribution by the energy of its merchants
and seamen, as England has done in like straits, it was thrown back upon
itself, cut off from the world by the navies of England and Holland, and
the girdle of enemies which surrounded it upon the continent. The only
escape from this process of gradual starvation was by an effectual
control of the sea; the creation of a strong sea power which should
ensure free play for the wealth of the land and the industry of the
people. For this, too, France had great natural advantages in her three
seaboards, on the Channel, the Atlantic, and the Mediterranean; and
politically she had had the fair opportunity of joining to her own
maritime power that of the Dutch in friendly alliance, hostile or at
least wary toward England. In the pride of his strength, conscious of
absolute control in his kingdom, Louis cast away this strong
reinforcement to his power, and proceeded to rouse Europe against him by
repeated aggressions. In the period which we have just considered,
France justified his confidence by a magnificent, and upon the whole
successful, maintenance of his attitude against all Europe; she did not
advance, but neither did she greatly recede. But this display of power
was exhausting; it ate away the life of the nation, because it drew
wholly upon itself and not upon the outside world, with which it could
have been kept in contact by the sea. In the war that next followed, the
same energy is seen, but not the same vitality; and France was
everywhere beaten back and brought to the verge of ruin. The lesson of
both is the same; nations, like men, however strong, decay when cut off
from the external activities and resources which at once draw out and
support their internal powers. A nation, as we have already shown,
cannot live indefinitely off itself, and the easiest way by which it can
communicate with other peoples and renew its own strength is the sea.
16. THE GROWTH OF BRITISH SEA POWER[42]
_England after the Peace of Utrecht, 1715_
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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