Significant changes, both in foreign and domestic policies, appeared. But underneath, as the suppression of the Hungarian revolt was to prove, lay the ruthless policies of Stalin. Under Malenkov, attempts were made to encourage the production of consumer items, but with his fall, stress reverted to the old Stalinist emphasis on heavy industry. In the foreign field, “B and K” made a widely heralded trip to Yugoslavia, there to woo Tito back into the Moscow camp. The “Big Smile” was radiant at the Geneva Conference of July, 1955, attended by heads of state of France, England, the United States, and Russia, and during highly publicized visits of “B and K” to India and Great Britain. The cult of Stalin, which had reached nauseating proportions, was toned down. Emphasis was laid on collective leadership. Then, on the night of February 24-25, 1956, came the bombshell that shook and shocked communists around the world—the bitter denunciation of Stalin by Khrushchev at the Twentieth Congress of the Russian Communist Party. It was as devastating a speech as was ever delivered by one man against another. Copies of the speech, not made public in Russia, found their way to the West and in June, 1956, were released by our own Department of State. Khrushchev denounced Stalin, the “great Stalin” who had been idolized by all communists as a man who could do no wrong, as a murderer, pathological liar, and perverter of Marxism-Leninism. In fiery language and with specific names and dates, Khrushchev accused Stalin of mass terror, deporting whole populations, forging false evidence against alleged enemies, being a coward during World War II, and possessing a vanity that led him to believe he was a god. Khrushchev in his systematic destruction of Stalin dealt with such matters as: _1. Mass terror:_ Stalin acted not through persuasion, explanation, and patient cooperation with people, but by imposing his concepts and demanding absolute submission to his opinion. Whoever opposed this concept or tried to prove his viewpoint, and the correctness of his position—was doomed to ... subsequent moral and physical annihilation. * * * * * Stalin put the Party and the NKVD [secret police] up to the use of mass terror.... * * * * * Mass arrests of Party, Soviet, economic and military workers caused tremendous harm to our country and to the cause of Socialist advancement. _2. Suspicion and distrust:_ Stalin was a very distrustful man, sickly suspicious; we knew this from our work with him. He could look at a man and say: “Why are your eyes so shifty today,” or “Why are you turning so much today and avoiding to look me directly in the eyes?” The sickly suspicion created in him a general distrust even toward eminent Party workers whom he had known for years. Everywhere and in everything he saw “enemies,” “two-facers” and “spies.”