On the 12th of August following, Lord Wellington entered Madrid, and was appointed generalissimo of the Spanish armies--a troublesome honour which there was some difficulty in inducing him to accept. He was created a marquis at home, thanks were voted to him for the battle of Salamanca, and he received a grant of 100,000 l. to purchase land. He was also in December of the same year made Duque da Vittoria in Portugal. In the meantime, the enormous force which had been brought together by the French, the refusal of the Spanish generals to co-operate, the failure of an attempt to capture the fortress of Burgos, and other causes, compelled the allies to retreat to Ciudad Rodrigo, with the determination of returning to Spain at a more fitting time. This retreat was conducted in the most admirable manner, and closed the campaign of 1812. The foregoing is necessarily a most meagre outline of events, on which volumes have been written. Those who may be anxious to read the Duke of Wellington's own account of the military operations, will find in the public despatches his annual summaries: for 1809, in despatch No. 343; for 1810, No. 504; and for 1811, No. 615. For 1812 there is no such summary. It would be a mistake, however, to suppose that the difficulties with which the Duke of Wellington had to contend during these the three first years of his service in Spain, were confined to the making of military dispositions and the winning of battles. Other causes there were, operating as a drawback at every forward step, and obstacles sufficient to have wearied a less stout heart or a less determined spirit. To oppose to a skillful and veteran enemy he had but an inadequate force, most scantily supplied with provisions, and even with money. The French generals, restrained by no principle of honour or even of policy, were accustomed to plunder mercilessly for the subsistence of their troops: the English commander would take nothing from the people but what was paid for on the spot in money or in bills on the English government. Yet, such was the apathy (or worse) of the Portuguese authorities, that even on these terms provisions were not forthcoming; and important operations were constantly delayed or frustrated by the want of the necessary subsistence for the troops.