Transcriber's Note: Italic text is denoted by _underscores_. * * * * * [Illustration: NICHOLAS II., THE TSAR OF RUSSIA AND THE TSAREVITCH] McCLURE'S MAGAZINE VOL. XXXI SEPTEMBER, 1908 No. 5 THE MILITARY AND POLITICAL MEMOIRS OF GENERAL KUROPATKIN MINISTER OF WAR AND COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF OF THE RUSSIAN ARMIES TRANSLATED BY GEORGE KENNAN ILLUSTRATED WITH PHOTOGRAPHS [TRANSLATOR'S NOTE.] The suppressed memoirs of General Kuropatkin are in four bulky volumes and contain, in the aggregate, about 600,000 words. The first three volumes are devoted, mainly, to a detailed review of the three great battles of the Russo-Japanese war--Liao-yang, the Sha-ho, and Mukden--from the standpoint of modern military science. The fourth volume, which is entitled "Summing up of the War," covers a very wide field, dealing partly with Russia's national problems, her military history, and her policy in Asia, and partly with the causes of the late war, the rise of Japan as a military power, and the reasons for the overwhelming defeat of Russia's armies in the Far East. _Copyright, 1908, by The S. S. McClure Co. All rights reserved_ [Illustration: STATE COUNCILLOR ALEXANDER MIKHAILOVICH BEZOBRAZOFF WHO ACQUIRED HIS EXTRAORDINARY POWER IN THE FAR EAST BY MEANS OF HIS KOREAN TIMBER COMPANY, AN ENTERPRISE IN WHICH HE INTERESTED THE TSAR OF RUSSIA TO THE EXTENT OF 2,000,000 RUBLES. RATHER THAN SACRIFICE THE FAMILY INVESTMENT IN THIS ENTERPRISE, THE TSAR ALLOWED RUSSIA TO BE DRAGGED INTO A WAR WITH JAPAN] I have chosen, as the subject for this article, General Kuropatkin's narrative of the events which preceded the rupture with Japan, in February, 1904, and which may be regarded, historically, as the causes of the war that ensued. It contains many new facts, and throws a flood of light upon Russian governmental methods, upon Russia's Asiatic policy, and upon the character of the monarch who now sits on the Russian throne. Kuropatkin begins this part of his work with a review of Russia's policy and territorial acquisitions in the Far East, which may be briefly summarized as follows: The question of obtaining an outlet on the Pacific Ocean was theoretically considered in Russia long ago; and the conclusion reached was that, in view of the sparseness of Russia's population east of Lake Baikal, and the insignificance of her commerce, foreign and domestic, in that part of the world, the task of getting access to the Pacific, which might involve a serious struggle, ought not to be imposed upon the existing generation. An outlet was not needed at that time, and it is not needed yet. The Russian War Department, moreover, has always regarded with apprehension, and as far as possible combatted, the opinion that "Russia is the most western of Asiatic states, not the most eastern of European," and that all her future lies beyond the Urals. [Illustration: ADMIRAL ALEXEIEFF