Mediæval Heresy & the InquisitionTurberville, Arthur Stanley
History
Mediæval Heresy & the Inquisition
Turberville, Arthur Stanley
Heresy; Inquisition; Sects, Medieval
Yet another most serious disability, under which the accused laboured,
was that he was not allowed the assistance of an advocate, he was
thrown entirely on his own resources in making his defence. Innocent
III expressly forbade advocates and notaries to lend any aid to
heretics or their abettors. The prohibition at first applied only to
the case of open and avowed heretics. Eymeric ruled that counsel were
in no wise to be denied to the accused, but he followed this up by the
qualification, that advocates espousing the cause of a heretic rendered
themselves liable to prosecution before the Inquisition, as suspect of
heresy themselves for doing so.[394] In actual practice what happened
probably was that when the evidence against the accused was clear, he
need expect no advocate; but when it was weak, then an advocate might
be forthcoming. For if the evidence in support of the charge of heresy
was strong, then assistance given to the accused was tantamount to
fautorship of heresy, which was in itself a very serious offence. In
any case the rôle of advocate was dangerous and there was no inducement
to compensate for so grave a risk.
That such assistance was seldom, if ever, actually given seems proved
by the absence of any indication of the practice even in the early
inquisitorial registers.[395] Very soon, however, it was decided
absolutely that the use of advocates was to be prohibited. Such was
the ruling of the Council of Albi in 1254; and the regulation soon
became general.[396] This was the really inevitable consequence of the
view which made the suspect a marked, a tainted man even before he had
stood his trial. But certainly one consideration which weighed heavily
against the use of advocates was the possibility of the practice
encouraging the spread of heresy, though the chances of an advocate’s
allowing himself to be infected by his client’s erroneous doctrines
were remote. In its attitude towards this question we are once more
reminded of the fundamental fact of the Inquisition’s twofold nature.
If the inquisitor be considered as a confessor, the accused as a
penitent paternally exhorted, lovingly urged to reconciliation, pardon
being assured for the truly repentant, what possible need can there be
for an advocate?[397] The tribunal gave every facility for the escape
of the prisoner from all the possible unhappy consequences of his
defamation, down _one_ avenue—confession, penance, reinstatement.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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