If the defendant was obstinately determined on defending himself, instead of throwing himself upon the mercy of the inquisitor, as representative of the infinite compassion of the Church, he was very much limited in his choice of pleadings. Ignorance was a possible plea—more likely to be accepted in the case of a woman than a man—but inquisitors were on their guard against feigned ignorance. That words complained of were only a _lapsus linguae_, or an idle jest uttered on the spur of the moment, or in drunkenness, might be accepted as a legitimate excuse. The plea of great perturbation of mind—mortal terror, for instance—might also possibly be accepted; but not the madness of love or the sudden grief of bereavement.[398] To make out a case on these lines was in any event very difficult, and the only device that promised any really good prospect of success was to challenge a witness on the ground that he was actuated by personal malice. But as the witnesses’ names were not disclosed, this was no easy matter. All that the accused could do, was to mention the names of any of his neighbours who might bear him a grudge, on the chance that they might be included among the authors of his defamation.[399] But it was not sufficient to indicate simple ill-will. The charge of heresy was so terrible that it was assumed that little short of mortal enmity would induce anyone to prefer it maliciously. The accused would, therefore, be carefully examined as to the nature of any quarrel with his neighbours that he might allege in his defence. The only purpose for which he was allowed the use of witnesses was to prove the facts of such a quarrel.