[180] _Letters of Hus_, pp. 146-9, 149-51. These are letters written by Hus at the time of his setting out for Constance. One of them, he instructs, is only to be opened in the event of his death. [181] See Gerson, _Works_, vol. ii, p. 572; H. v. der Hardt, _Magnum oecumenicum Constantiense concilium_ (Frankfort, 1697-1742), vol. iv, p. 521; Palacky, _Documenta_, p. 284; Lea, vol. ii, pp. 467-8. ‘The explanation of the controversy over the violation of the safe-conduct is perfectly simple. Germany, and especially Bohemia, knew so little about the Inquisition and the systematic persecution of heresy that surprise and indignation were excited by the application to the case of Hus of the recognized principles of the canon law. The Council could not have done otherwise than it did without surrendering those principles.’ [182] _Letters of Hus_, p. 216. [183] Lützow, p. 249. [184] Palacky, _Documenta_, pp. 308, 310. Like Wycliffe before and Luther after him, Hus would acknowledge no other authority than Scripture. The Council wanted him to acknowledge the authority of the Church and of itself as the Church’s representative. [185] _Letters of Hus_, p. 226. [186] _Ibid._, p. 217. [187] _Ibid._, p. 224. [188] _Letters of Hus_, p. 239. See also his letter addressed to all the people of Bohemia, pp. 230-3; also pp. 275-6, and Palacky, _Documenta_, p. 323. See Creighton, _Papacy_, vol. ii, p. 51: ‘ ... It is the glory of Hus that he first deliberately asserted the right of the individual conscience against ecclesiastical authority, and sealed his assertion by his own life-blood.’ [189] See, however, J. Mackinnon, _A History of Modern Liberty_ (1906), vol. i, p. 162: ‘The defiance of the Council was the prelude of the modern Reformation. It was a distinct intimation not merely of a solitary reformer like Wiclif or Hus, but of a body of men who claimed to speak in the name of a whole people, that they would not submit to traditional authority _per se_. It was a plea for fair discussion of matters of controversy, and a protest against the principle of stifling inquiry and dissent by such authority. Otherwise the reason and intelligence of the inquirer will revolt in the name of conscience, justice and religion.’