Medical Jurisprudence as it Relates to Insanity, According to the Law of EnglandHaslam, John
Science
Medical Jurisprudence as it Relates to Insanity, According to the Law of England
Haslam, John
Insanity (Law) -- Great Britain; Mental illness -- Jurisprudence
Those are the states of the human intellect which have a distinct and
separate existence, and which are capable of being described from
their manifestations; there can be no intermediate state, and certainly
no abstract or independant unsoundness: which, when it is acknowledged,
must, on the one hand, be derived from insanity, or from idiotcy on
the other. But the law has established a different system, and it is
observed that “It seems to have been a very long time before those
who had the administration of justice in this department, thought
themselves at liberty to issue a commission, when the person was
represented as not being ideot ex nativitate, as not being lunatic, but
as being of unsound mind, importing by those words, the notion, that
the party was in _some such state_, as was to be contradistinguished
from idiotcy; and as he was to be contradistinguished from lunacy, and
yet _such_ as made him a proper object of a commission, _in the nature_
of a commission to enquire of idiotcy, or a commission to enquire of
lunacy.” Accepting this with great humility as the law, it is equally
dutiful to endeavour to discover on what facts or experience it was
established: and the only clue to this investigation is found in the
words “_in some such state_,” as was neither idiotcy nor lunacy, but
“such” as disqualified him from exercising the volition of an ordinary
man, by an instrument “in the nature” of a commission applicable to
ideot or lunatic.
If this undefined unsoundness of mind, can thus dispossess the
individual of his liberty, and of the use of his property, under
the issuing of a commission, it performs sufficient; but it may be
respectfully enquired, what would be the general opinion, or that
of the commissioners of the College of Physicians, if a medical
practitioner were to give a certificate to confine a person in a
madhouse, declaring he was neither an ideot nor a lunatic, but of
unsound mind?—And what attention would the judge and jury give to a
physician in a criminal court who came to prove that a man who had
committed murder was not responsible for the crime, because he was
neither an ideot nor a lunatic, but of unsound mind; importing by these
words that he was in _some such state_ as was to be contradistinguished
from idiotcy, and as he was to be contradistinguished from lunacy?
After having taken this view of the subject, which is the result of
extensive experience in this department of the profession, and of
diligent enquiry into the nature of the human mind; it appears to me,
that the medical practitioner may safely and conscientiously infer
unsoundness of mind, if such term be legally insisted on, whenever a
morbid condition of intellect prevails, to an extent which deprives the
mind of its natural and healthy offices, by producing an incapacity or
inability in the individual to conduct himself and manage his affairs.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account