be the patient, but that the statute will be applied only for the protection of the patient, and where it is apparent that no injury can possibly be done to the patient or his memory by the admission of the evidence, and the interests of justice demand the disclosure, for the punishment of a person for an injury done to the patient involving a violation of the criminal law, and the patient is not alive to waive the privilege, that the disclosure is not forbidden. In New York efforts have been made to exclude from the operation of the statute other classes of actions, to which it has been urged that the reasons for the enactment do not apply, or in which the mischief alleged to be wrought by its enforcement has been suggested as ground for believing that the legislature could not have intended to include them. Of these, actions for divorce on the ground of adultery are one class; but it has been held that they constitute no exception.[252] _Testamentary Causes._—In New York it was long supposed that the policy of the law excepted probate proceedings; it was so held by the Surrogate of New York City;[253] and also by the General Term of the Supreme Court,[254] by which it was stated that the practice had prevailed for a half-century in will cases,[255] but the Court of Appeals,[256] has decided that testamentary cases constitute no exception to the rule, the judge who delivered the opinion stating that there is no more reason for allowing secret ailments of a patient to be brought to light in a contest over his will than in any other case, and that if mischief be wrought by the law the remedy lies with the legislature and not with the courts. The legislature has since afforded the remedy,[257] but not to the extent of adopting the rule of the earlier cases. In Indiana, in an action to set aside a will, the testimony of the testator’s physician has been excluded.[258] And in Michigan and Missouri it seems that testamentary cases are no exception to the general rule.[259] _Lunacy and Habitual Drunkenness._—It has been claimed in New York that inquisitions of lunacy are an exception, and recently it has been held that the alleged lunatic’s physician may testify as to his mental condition because no one is better qualified to testify,[260] but this decision seems to be at variance with the principle of the decisions of the Court of Appeals with reference to testamentary cases, and presents no satisfactory reason for a distinction. In a similar case in the Supreme Court, Chambers, it was held that a medical attendant at an asylum could not testify.[261] It has also been held that a physician cannot make an affidavit as to the appearance and condition of his patient to support a petition for the appointment of a committee for him as an habitual drunkard.[262]