_Fraud._—Still another class of actions in which contending principles have been invoked to make an exception in the law of privilege, is actions on life-insurance contracts. The contract of insurance is _uberrimæ fidei_, and the defence of fraud in the application is frequently interposed to defeat a claim under a policy. Medical testimony would often be the most satisfactory evidence to establish the fraud, and efforts have been made to introduce it under that excuse, but without avail. In the case of Dilleber _vs._ Home Life Insurance Company, in the Supreme Court of New York at General Term,[263] the question seems to have been directly before the court, and Davis, P. J., dissenting, insisted that the suppression of a physician’s testimony ought not to be permitted so as to cover up a fraud, but the majority of the court held otherwise; the case was subsequently overruled, but not on the ground urged by Justice Davis.[264] The number of insurance cases in which the rule has been enforced seems to leave it beyond question that it will not be relaxed for the purpose of establishing fraud,[265] although that announcement has not been specifically made. There seems no reason that the rule should be relaxed in that regard when it is not relaxed to establish the crime of the patient; though the mischief that may be done in such cases is apparent.[266] _The Witness._—The statutory provisions as to the professional status of the witness whose testimony is excluded have already been shown.[267] The facts which establish the relation of physician and patient will be treated later.[268] The witness is a member of a profession, but there is very little discussion in the cases as to what constitutes a physician or surgeon.[269] The language of the statutes as well as their policy and intent has been said to plainly embrace a physician who casually or in any way attends and prescribes for a patient, whether he be a family physician or the usual medical attendant or not.[270] The spirit of the acts would protect communications made to any person attending the patient in the accepted capacity of physician or surgeon wherever that might have happened, though the letter would confine it in some instances to duly authorized or duly licensed persons. It does not seem to have been established whether such authority or license must have been granted under the laws of the State where the trial is conducted, nor how the several statutes apply to communications made elsewhere, especially in States or countries where authority or license to practise is not required by law.