Memoir of John Howe Peyton: in sketches by his contemporaries, together with some of his public and private letters, etc., also a sketch of Ann M. Peyton
History
Memoir of John Howe Peyton: in sketches by his contemporaries, together with some of his public and private letters, etc., also a sketch of Ann M. Peyton
Peyton, Anne Montgomery, 1802-1850; Peyton, John Howe, 1778-1847
The members of the supreme court, are selected from those in the United
States, who are most celebrated for virtue and legal learning, not at
the will of a single individual, but by the concurrent wishes of the
President and Senate of the United States; they will therefore have no
local prejudices or partialities. The duties they have to perform, lead
them necessarily to the most enlarged and accurate acquaintance with the
jurisdiction of the Federal and State courts together, and with the
admirable symmetry of our Government. The tenure of their offices
enables them to pronounce the sound and correct opinions they may have
formed without fear, favour, or partiality.
The amendment of the Constitution proposed by Pennsylvania seems to be
founded upon the idea that the Federal judiciary will, from a lust of
power, enlarge their jurisdiction, to the total annihilation of the
jurisdiction of the State courts; that they will exercise their will
instead of the law and the Constitution.
This argument, if it proves anything, would operate more strongly
against the tribunal proposed to be created, which promises so little,
than against the State courts, which, for the reason given, have every
thing connected with their appointment calculated to insure confidence.
What security have we, were the proposed amendments adopted, that this
tribunal would not substitute their will and their pleasure in place of
the law? The Judiciary are the weakest of the three departments of
government, and least dangerous to the political rights of the
Constitution; they hold neither the purse, nor the sword; and even to
enforce their own judgments and decisions, must ultimately depend upon
the executive arm. Should the Federal judiciary, however unmindful of
their weakness, unmindful of the duty which they owe to themselves, and
their country, become corrupt and transcend the limits of their
jurisdiction, would the proposed amendment oppose even a probable
barrier to such an improbable state of things?
The creation of a tribunal, such as is proposed by Pennsylvania, so far
as we are able to form an idea of it, from the description given in the
resolutions of the Legislature of the State, would, in the opinion of
your Committee, tend rather to invite them to prevent collisions between
the Federal and State courts. It might also become in process of time, a
serious and dangerous embarrassment to the operations of the general
government.
Resolved, therefore: That the Legislature of this State do disapprove of
the amendment to the Constitution of the United States proposed by the
Legislature of Pennsylvania.
Resolved also: That his Excellency the Governor be, and he is hereby
requested to transmit forthwith a copy of the foregoing preamble and
resolutions to each of the Senators and representatives of this State
in Congress, and to the executives of the several states in the union,
with a request that the same be laid before the Legislature thereof.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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