Memoir of the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, in Portugal and Spain,: By an officer employed in his army — John Shaqi
Memoir of the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, in Portugal and Spain,: By an officer employed in his armyWestmorland, John Fane, Earl of
History
Memoir of the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, in Portugal and Spain,: By an officer employed in his army
Westmorland, John Fane, Earl of
Peninsular War, 1807-1814 -- Personal narratives; Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 1769-1852
The next point to be considered is the effect which would have been
produced by following up the enemy after the victory of Vimiera. General
Junot had advanced from Torres Vedras by a circuitous road to Vimiera;
and after his defeat the corps under Major General Hill, which had taken
no part in the action, was in possession of the direct road to that
place. The ground about Torres Vedras is extremely strong; and it is the
only good pass by which the French army could have retired to Lisbon.
Sir Arthur Wellesley was convinced that Major General Hill might have
occupied the town before the enemy could have reached it; and that he
might have defended the positions about it, till the army which was to
have followed the French should have been able to communicate with him.
The great objection that was raised to this project was, that the
British army was almost destitute of cavalry, whilst the French had of
that arm a force of at least 1,200 men; but Sir Arthur Wellesley relied
upon his own genius to provide a remedy to this objection; our infantry
was in the best order, and it has too often since been tried in presence
of a superior cavalry, to leave doubt in the mind of any British
officer, that (if judiciously managed and supported with artillery), it
is competent to advance in the face of cavalry. If, therefore, Sir
Arthur Wellesley’s intentions had been carried into effect, the
probability is, that General Hill would have taken the enemy’s baggage
at Torres Vedras; that pursued by the British army, General Junot would
have been unable to force the positions about that town; that he must,
consequently, have retired by some other road, and his army have been
subjected to considerable loss.
There remains only for us to consider the effects produced, by bringing
the corps under the orders of Sir John Moore to Marceira Bay, instead of
allowing it to proceed to Santarem.
Sir Arthur Wellesley had from the first conceived, that the corps under
his immediate command was as considerable as could conveniently be
employed upon the advance to Lisbon, and was of sufficient force to
secure the success of that operation; but he foresaw that it would be
impossible for him to prevent the French army from retiring through the
Alemtejo, to Elvas, unless he could bring a separate corps to intercept
it; with that view he had recommended the march of Sir John Moore upon
Santarem, and that excellent officer, upon his arrival in Mondego Bay,
disembarked a considerable portion of his troops with the view of
executing that movement.
From the moment Sir Arthur Wellesley was apprized of the determination
of Sir Harry Burrard to prevent that operation, and found himself
arrested in his pursuit of the enemy after the battle of Vimiera, he
gave up all hope of enclosing the French in Lisbon, or of preventing
their protracting the campaign (if they thought fit to do so) by a
movement into the southern provinces of Portugal.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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