Memoir of the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, in Portugal and Spain,: By an officer employed in his army — John Shaqi
Memoir of the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, in Portugal and Spain,: By an officer employed in his armyWestmorland, John Fane, Earl of
History
Memoir of the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, in Portugal and Spain,: By an officer employed in his army
Westmorland, John Fane, Earl of
Peninsular War, 1807-1814 -- Personal narratives; Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 1769-1852
The necessary arrangements being made, and Major General Mackinnon
placed in the command of the hospitals at Talavera, Sir Arthur Wellesley
marched on the morning of the 3d of August for Oropesa. A short time
after his arrival at that place, he learnt that the advanced guard of
Soult’s army was arrived at Naval Moral, and that the Spaniards, who had
retired from Bejar, had crossed the Tagus at Almaraz, and destroyed the
bridge; he determined, however, to move upon the French, and was in
hopes of finding them the following day. General Bassecour, with a
Spanish division, was moving along the Tietar, and was destined to act
upon the left and rear of the French. About four o’clock in the
afternoon, however, a despatch arrived from General Cuesta, announcing
to Sir Arthur Wellesley, that, from intelligence upon which he could
rely, he was persuaded that the corps of Marshal Ney had evacuated
Gallicia, and formed a junction with the corps of Marshal Mortier, from
Valladolid; that the two were united with Marshal Soult; and that the
amount of the collected force upon the rear of the allied army, could
not be less than 55,000 men; that Marshal Victor was at no great
distance from Talavera, upon the other side; that he (General Cuesta)
apprehended an attack from him; and had in consequence determined to
break up immediately from that town, and join Sir Arthur Wellesley at
Oropesa. This information was as disastrous as it was unexpected: the
letter from General Cuesta further stated, that his movement was already
begun, and that his army would form its junction with the British in the
course of the night: there remained, therefore, no hope of preventing or
delaying it, and the whole plan, upon which Sir Arthur Wellesley had
undertaken his operation, was at once destroyed.
The bridge of Almaraz was no longer in existence; the bridge of
Arzobispo was exposed, by the abandonment of Talavera, to the corps of
Victor, and the whole allied army, if it advanced, might be cut off from
any retreat across the Tagus, while its movement upon Portugal must
depend upon the success of its attack upon the combined army of Ney,
Soult, and Mortier. In this situation of affairs Sir Arthur Wellesley
did not hesitate to give up offensive operations, and retire across the
Tagus, by the bridge of Arzobispo.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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