Memoir of the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, in Portugal and Spain,: By an officer employed in his armyWestmorland, John Fane, Earl of
History
Memoir of the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, in Portugal and Spain,: By an officer employed in his army
Westmorland, John Fane, Earl of
Peninsular War, 1807-1814 -- Personal narratives; Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 1769-1852
In co-operation with this force was a corps of Portuguese
Militia 10,000
The corps under the Marquis Romana 12,000
——————
Making a total of 76,000
The French force under Massena was
Men.
The Infantry of the 2d, 6th and 8th corps 62,000
The Cavalry 6,000
The Artillery, &c. 4,000
——————
Total 72,000
To this were afterwards joined two Divisions of
The 9th corps under Count Erlon 10,000
The remaining division of this corps under General Claparede 8,000
The corps of Marshal Mortier which cooperated to the south of
the Tagus, 13,000
———
Making a total of 103,000
These numbers are the very lowest at which the French army can be
calculated. Buonaparte always called the force under Massena alone
100,000 men; and the French officers, before the invasion of Portugal,
gave the same account of the numbers with which they were to overwhelm
us.
In comparing the amount of the two armies, the description of force of
which they were composed should be taken into consideration. The
Portuguese had as yet been perfectly untried; and their militia was so
defective in organization as to be evidently unfit for the operations of
a campaign. Yet Lord Wellington was not alarmed at the disparity of
numbers, or the superior organization of the troops of the enemy; he
relied upon his own genius to baffle their efforts, and combined his
plans with reference to the troops he had to command.
In the latter part of the year 1809, while Lord Wellington was still at
Badajos, he had contemplated the possibility of his being attacked in
Portugal by a superior force; he had considered the nature of the
country he should have to defend, as well as the system of warfare which
would most tend to support the contest in the Peninsula: he looked upon
the preservation of his own army as the guarantee of the future triumph
of the cause he was to maintain: the extension of the enemy, in the
occupation of distant provinces, must be a source of weakness to him;
the lengthening his communications must add considerably to his
embarrassments. Lord Wellington, therefore, fixed upon the heights of
Sobral and Torres Vedras, as the best positions in which he could
collect his army, and offer battle to the superior forces of his enemy.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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