Memoir of the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, in Portugal and Spain,: By an officer employed in his armyWestmorland, John Fane, Earl of
History
Memoir of the early campaigns of the Duke of Wellington, in Portugal and Spain,: By an officer employed in his army
Westmorland, John Fane, Earl of
Peninsular War, 1807-1814 -- Personal narratives; Wellington, Arthur Wellesley, Duke of, 1769-1852
The army of Marshal Massena, while attempting the conquest of Portugal,
could lend no aid towards the reduction of the people in the Peninsula:
as long as it was in observation of the British troops, whether on the
Spanish frontier or in the lines of Lisbon, it could as little assist
the views of Buonaparte in reducing the country to obedience; the
destruction of Lord Wellington’s army could alone enable Massena to
fulfil the objects of his Imperial Master. The preventing that
catastrophe formed the basis of Lord Wellington’s plans for the
campaign. He was neither strong enough, nor had he any wish, to
undertake offensive operations: the state of Spain was not such as to
make them advisable; they must necessarily be commenced at considerable
risk against a superior army; and if they were unsuccessful, the cause
of the Peninsula was lost. By the plan which Lord Wellington had
determined upon, he promised to preserve his army, to increase its
discipline, to augment its numbers, to draw the French into a country
where their means of subsistence would be confined, and where their
force would not be sufficient to maintain even their communications with
the depôts, which must necessarily be placed at a distance from them.
Massena advanced from Salamanca in the beginning of June, to commence
the siege of Ciudad Rodrigo; he brought with him a considerable train of
artillery, and expected the place would surrender upon being summoned.
But it was defended with considerable ability and valour, and was only
yielded into the hands of the enemy upon the 18th of July, after the
breaches were practicable and the principal defences destroyed. Many
persons at the time conceived that Lord Wellington had seen the fall of
this fortress with considerable indifference, since he had made no
movement to relieve it; but it is only necessary to point out the
results of victory or defeat to the different armies, to shew the
propriety of Lord Wellington’s determination not to risk a general
action. To attack the French he must have crossed the Coa and the
Agueda; if he had been defeated, he would have had great difficulty in
repassing those rivers, and saving the wrecks of his army; he would no
longer have been able to provide for the defence of Portugal with a
beaten army; he must have evacuated the country. If he beat the French
they would have retired upon reinforcements, and would have been
prepared to advance upon him again in a very short time. Lord Wellington
would have had to lament the brave men he must have lost in an action,
which would but have relieved Ciudad Rodrigo for a short time, as he
must afterwards have abandoned it to the superior numbers of the enemy.
His army must also have been considerably weakened; and most likely
would have been unequal to the task afterwards to be imposed upon it, in
the defence of Portugal.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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