When officially informed that a senator from Georgia threatened that, unless the lands of the Creek Indians, claimed by that state as within its boundaries, were ceded, her weight would be thrown for General Jackson, Mr. Adams replied, "that we ought not to yield to Georgia, because we could not do so without gross injustice; and that, as to her being driven to support General Jackson, he felt little care about that. He had no more confidence in the one party than the other." A similar reply was made to an influential New York politician, who told him that the friends of De Witt Clinton would probably support the administration, but that Van Buren and his bucktails would be inveterate in their opposition. "I consider it," said he, "a lottery-ticket whether either of those parties would support the administration." The opposition to the election, and subsequently to the administration of Mr. Adams, in the South, had its origin and support, as we have seen, first, in the fact that he was (with the exception of his father) the only President who had not been a slaveholder; and, next, in the fixed determination, in that section of the Union, to keep the Presidency, if possible, in the hands of an individual belonging to that class. If, from circumstances, this should be no longer practicable, then their policy would be to select a candidate who had no sympathy for the slave, and whose subserviency to the supremacy of Southern interests was unquestionable. The attempt to extinguish slavery in Missouri, although it had resulted in what was called the Missouri compromise, had created towards all who were not slaveholders a feverish jealousy in the South, which descended on Mr. Adams with double violence because his free spirit was known. This was not diminished by the fact that he had, neither in act nor language, ever transcended the provisions of the constitution, but had, in every instance, fully recognized its obligations. In February, 1826, two resolutions, which had been adopted in executive session, were brought to Mr. Adams. The first declared "that the expediency of the Panama mission ought to be debated in Senate with open doors, unless the publication of the documents, to which it would be necessary to refer in debate, would prejudice existing negotiations. The second was a respectful request to the President of the United States to inform the Senate whether such objection exists to the publication of all or any part of those documents; and, if so, to specify to what part it applies."