Memoirs of the Reign of King George the Third, Volume 2 (of 4)Walpole, Horace
History
Memoirs of the Reign of King George the Third, Volume 2 (of 4)
Walpole, Horace
Great Britain -- History -- 1760-1789; Great Britain -- History -- George III, 1760-1820
outlawed, banished, had no longer any interest in the question: the
Secretaries of State did not desire to brine it to any issue; the
House of Commons alone could do it. Sir Edward Coke declared, that,
when courts of law would not decide on a clear question, the House of
Commons ought. Sir Alexander Gilmour added, that not one lawyer, last
year, had defended the legality of General Warrants, but had given
assurances that they would be decided in the Courts below; and yet
that decision had been postponed till Wilkes had been outlawed.
Dr. Hay replied with much and able subtlety; owned that when he was
for putting off the question last year he had meant to reject it; his
party had said that it was not proper for that House to declare on
law; he himself had said those warrants were illegal, unless great
urgency in their favour.[52] He agreed that, by the common law of
the land, those warrants were illegal: nay, he thought the question
ought to be settled by Parliament, not by a resolution of one House
only. Sir William had omitted the words _seditious_ and _treasonable_,
though adopted last year. The House might do what it pleased, but
ought it to do so? Why not make the case general to all cases? Then
this resolution, he heard, was to be followed by another on breach of
privilege; but was every injury to a member a breach of privilege? Was
the House to be an universal judicatory for offences? But the House had
already declared that it has no privilege in the case of seditious and
treasonable libels--a question of law is safe in courts of law; but
Houses of Commons, not being permanent, may vary their resolutions.
One House--both Houses cannot declare laws, though they, with the
King, may enact laws. The question had either been adjudged, or was
pending: both were true. The Court of Common Pleas had decided and
given damages; then he named the Chief Justice Pratt, taking notice
of the strong expression of _an iron rod_, used by that magistrate
on the occasion. All juries say General Warrants are illegal; but at
present the question had been hung up by the bill of exceptions, which
bills are in the nature of appeals--an argument why the House should
not, at that time, make a declaration. If there had been delay, why
was not the offender called on? He had heard that the delay arose
from the prosecutors. If anything was done wrong in the Courts below,
the House alone could redress it. He then, as a correction to the
proposed question, moved the following strange and scarce intelligible
sentence (to load the motion ridiculously, and with intention to
reject afterwards the question so amended), “That in the particular
case of libels, it is proper and necessary to fix, by a vote of this
House only, what ought to be deemed the law in respect of General
Warrants; and for that purpose, at the time when the determination of
the legality of such warrants, in the instance of a most seditious and
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