By the _indicative_ stage of language, or sign-making, I will understand the earliest stage that is exhibited by intentional sign-making. This stage corresponds to the divisions marked four and six in my representative scheme (p. 88), and, as we have now so fully seen, is common to animals and human beings. Indicative signs, then, whether in the form of gestures, tones, or words, are intentionally significant. For the most part they are expressive of emotional states, and simple desires. When, for example, an infant holds out its arms to be taken by the nurse, or points to objects in order to be taken to them, it cannot be said to be _naming_ anything; yet it is clearly _indicating_ its wants. Infants also cry _intentionally_, or as a partly conventional sign to show discomfort, whether bodily or mental.[92] They will likewise at an early age learn wholly conventional signs whereby to indicate—though not yet to name—particular feelings, objects, qualities, and actions. My son, for instance, was taught by his nurse to shake his head for “No,” nod it for “Yes,” and wave his hand for “Ta-ta,” or leave-taking: all these indicative gestures he performed well and appropriately when eight and a half months old. This indicative stage of language, or sign-making, is universally exhibited by all the more intelligent animals, although not to so great an extent as in infants. The parrot which depresses its head to invite a scratching, the dog which begs before a wash-stand, the cat which pulls one’s clothes to solicit help for her kittens in distress—all these animals are making what I call _indicative_ signs. Following upon the indicative stage of language there is what I have called _denotative_ (7 A in the scheme on p. 88). This likewise occurs both in animals and in children when first beginning to speak—talking birds, for instance, being able to learn and correctly use names as _notæ_, or marks, of particular objects, qualities, and actions. Yet such _notæ_—be they verbal or otherwise—thus learned by special association, are not, strictly speaking, _names_. By the use of such a sign the talking bird merely affixes a vocal mark to a particular object, quality, or action: it does not _extend_ the sign to any other similar objects, qualities, or actions of the same class; and, therefore, by its use of that sign does not really _connote_ anything of the particular object, quality, or action which it _denotes_.