different mass of connotative meaning from that which it presented to the child, who first extended it from a bright point in the sky to a candle shining in a room. And the reason of this great difference is, that the conceptual thought of the astronomer, besides having greatly _added_ to the connotation, has also greatly _improved_ it. The only common quality which the name served to connote when used by the child was that of brightness; but, although the astronomer is not blind to this point of resemblance between a star and a candle, he disregards it in the presence of fuller knowledge, and will not apply the term even to objects so much more closely resembling a star as a comet or a meteor. Now, this greater _accuracy_ of connotation, quite as much as the greater _mass_ of it, has been reached by the astronomer in virtue of his powers of conceptual thought. It is because he has thought about his names _as_ names that he has thus been able with so much accuracy to define their meanings—_i.e._ to limit their connotations in some directions, as well as to extend them in others. Obviously, therefore, we are here in the presence of a great distinction, and one which needs itself to be in some way connoted. It is, indeed, but a special exhibition of the one great distinction which I have carried through the whole course of this work—namely, that between ideation as receptual and conceptual. But it is none the less important to designate this special exhibition of it by means of well-defined terms; and I can only express surprise that such should not already have been done by logicians. The terms which I shall use are the following. By a connotative name I will understand the connotative extension of a denotative name, whether such extension be great or small, and, therefore, whether it be extended receptually or conceptually. But for the _exclusively conceptual_ extension of a name I will reserve the convenient term _denomination_. This term, like those previously defined, was introduced by the schoolmen, and by them was used as synonymous with connotation. But it is evident that they (and all subsequent writers) only had before their minds the case of conceptual connotation, and hence they felt no need of the distinction which for present purposes it is obviously imperative to draw. Now, I do not think that any two more appropriate words could be found whereby to express this distinction than are these words _connotation_ and _denomination_, if for the purposes of my own subsequent analysis I am allowed to define them in accordance with their etymology. For, when so defined, a connotative sign will mean a _classificatory_ sign, whether conferred receptually or conceptually; while a denominative sign will mean a connotative sign which has been conferred as such _with a truly conceptual intention_—_i.e._ with an introspective appreciation of its function as all that logicians understand by a _name_. I will now sum up these sundry definitions.