Mental Evolution in Man: Origin of Human FacultyRomanes, George John
Science
Mental Evolution in Man: Origin of Human Faculty
Romanes, George John
Evolution; Psychology, Comparative
One further remark remains to be added before our nomenclature of
ideas can be regarded as complete. It will have been noticed that
the term “general idea” is equally appropriate to ideas of class or
kind, whether or not such ideas are named. The ideas Good-for-eating
and Not-good-for-eating are as general to an animal as they are to a
man, and have in each case been formed in the same way—namely, by
an accumulation of particular experiences spontaneously assorted in
consciousness. General ideas of this kind, however, have not been
contemplated by previous writers while dealing with the psychology of
generalization: hence the term “general,” like the term “abstract,”
has by usage become restricted to those higher products of ideation
which depend on the faculty of language. And the only words that I can
find to have been used by any previous writers to designate the ideas
concerned in that lower kind of generalization which does not depend
on language, are the words above given—namely, Complex, Compound,
and Mixed. Now, none of these words are so good as the word General,
because none of them express the notion of _genus_ or _class_; and the
great distinction between the idea which an animal or an infant has,
say of an individual man and of men in general, is not that the one
idea is simple, and the other complex, compound, or mixed; but that the
one idea is _particular_ and the other _general_. Therefore consistency
would dictate that the term “general” should be applied to _all_
ideas of class or kind, as distinguished from ideas of particulars
or individuals—irrespective of the _degree_ of generality, and
irrespective, therefore, of the accident whether or not, _quâ_ general,
such ideas are dependent on language. Nevertheless, as the term has
been through previous usage restricted to ideas of the higher order of
generality, I will not introduce confusion by extending its use to the
lower order, or by speaking of an animal as capable of generalizing. A
parallel term, however, is needed; and, therefore, I will speak of the
general or class ideas which are formed without the aid of language as
_generic_. This word has the double advantage of retaining a verbal
as well as a substantial analogy with the allied term _general_. It
also serves to indicate that generic ideas, or recepts, are not only
ideas of class or kind, but have been _generated_ from the intermixture
of individual ideas—_i.e._ from the blended memories of particular
percepts.
My nomenclature of ideas, therefore, may be presented in a tabular form
thus:—
{ General, Abstract, or Notional = Concepts.
IDEAS { Complex, Compound, or Mixed = Recepts, or Generic Ideas.
{ Simple, Particular, or Concrete = Memories of Percepts.[25]
CHAPTER III.
LOGIC OF RECEPTS.
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