Mental Evolution in Man: Origin of Human FacultyRomanes, George John
Science
Mental Evolution in Man: Origin of Human Faculty
Romanes, George John
Evolution; Psychology, Comparative
recepts everywhere proceeds _pari passu_ with that of percepts. I say
that a very little thought is enough to show that this _must_ be so,
while a very little observation is enough to show that it _is_ so.
For, _a priori_, the more unformed the powers of perception, the less
able must they be to take cognizance of particulars. The development
of these powers consists in the ever-increasing efficiency of their
analysis, or _cognition_ of smaller and smaller differences of detail;
and, consequently, of their _recognition_ of these differences in
different combinations. Hence, the feebler the powers of perception,
the more must they occupy themselves with the larger or class
distinctions between objects of sensuous experience, and the less
with the smaller or more individual distinctions. Or, if we like,
what afterwards become class distinctions, are at earlier stages of
ideation the _only_ distinctions; and, therefore, all the same as
what are afterwards individual distinctions. But what follows? Surely
that—be it in the individual or the race—when these originally
individual distinctions begin to grow into class distinctions, they
leave in the mind an indelible impress of their first nativity: they
were the original recepts of memory, and if they are afterwards slowly
differentiated as they slowly become organized into many particular
parts, this does not hinder that throughout the process they never lose
their organic unity: the mind must always continue to recognize that
the parts which it subsequently perceived as successively unfolding
from what at first was known only as a whole, are parts which belong
to that whole—or, in other words, that the more newly observed
particulars are members of what is now perceived as a class. Therefore,
I say, on merely _a priori_ grounds we might banish the gratuitous
statement that the lower the order of ideation the more it is concerned
with particular distinctions, or the less with class distinctions. The
truth must be that the more primitive the recepts the larger are the
class distinctions with which they are concerned—provided, of course,
that this statement is not taken to apply beyond the region of sensuous
perception.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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