Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
_Objections to the term Suggestion._--The name original suggestion
has been commonly applied, of late, especially in this country, to
designate the faculty now under consideration. It is so used by
Professor Upham, and by Dr. Wayland. It is liable, however, to serious
objections. The term suggestion does not seem to me to express the
peculiar characteristic, the distinctive element and office of this
faculty. It is not peculiar to the ideas now in question, that they
are _suggested_ to the mind; many other ideas, all ideas, in fact,
are suggested by something. This class of our thoughts, therefore,
is no more entitled to that name than any other class. Nor is it
peculiar to this class that they are _original_ suggestions. The mind
has many other equally original ideas that are likewise suggestions
from things without, or from its own operations--mere fancies many of
them, imaginations. We need to distinguish, in this case, the merely
fanciful, the ideal, from the real. The terms intuitive and intuition,
while they imply the reality of the thing perceived, indicate, also,
the immediateness of the process.
_More serious Objection._--But there is a still further and more
serious objection to the term suggestion as thus employed. The word
does not, and cannot, with propriety, be made to denote what is now
intended. It has a transitive significance, and cannot be made to
denote a purely subjective process. Objects external suggest certain
ideas to my mind. I suggest ideas to other minds. The faculty of
suggestion lies, properly, not with the mind that receives the
suggestion, but with the mind or object that gives it. But when we say
the mind has the faculty of original suggestion, we do not mean that
it has the power of suggesting original ideas to other minds; we refer
to that power of the mind by which, in virtue of its constitution,
certain ideas, not strictly derived from sense, are awakened in it when
the occasion presents itself. We intend not a power of suggesting, but
rather of receiving suggestions, a power of _conceiving_ ideas, a power
of original and intuitive conceptions. To say that the mind suggests
to itself ideas of space, time, etc., is a singular use of terms. I
understand what is meant by suggesting ideas to others, and what it
is to receive suggestions from others, and to have ideas suggested by
events, occurrences and objects without, and how one thought may, by
some law of association, suggest another. But how the mind suggests
ideas to _itself_, is not so clear. A man, in a fit of abstraction,
talks to himself, but whether he suggests ideas to himself in that way,
so that he finds his own conversation instructive and profitable, may
admit of question. The truth is, the idea is suggested, not _by_ the
mind, but _to_ the mind--suggested from without. The mind has the power
of conceiving certain ideas, which are awakened or excited in it by
the occasion which presents itself. To call this faculty a faculty of
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Elsewhere in the archive
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account