_Not a mere Conception._--Like space, it is a law of thought, a conception, and like space it is not a _mere_ law of thought, not a mere conception of the mind, not altogether subjective. Nor is it a mere relation of one event to another in succession. It is, on the contrary, _necessary to_, and prior to, all succession and all events. It does not depend on the occurrence of events, but the occurrence of events depends on _it_. As space would still exist were matter annihilated, so time would continue were events to cease. But were time blotted out there could be no succession, no occurrence or event. Time is essential, not to the mere thought or _conception_ of events, but to the _possibility_ of the thing itself. It is not, then, a mere idea, or conception of the mind, nor a mere relation. It has, in a sense, objectivity and reality, since it is the ground and condition of all continuous active existence, as space is of all extended formal existence, the _sine quâ non_, without which not merely our idea and conception of such existence would vanish, but the thing itself. There could be no such thing as active continuous existence, either of mind or matter, since mind and spirit, as continuous and persistent in any of its moods and phases, much more as passing from one to another of those moods, implies succession. Time is to mind what space is to matter. _Matter_ protends in _space_, _mind_ in _time_. Time is even less purely subjective than space, for should we say that both matter and space are mere subjective phenomena, mere conceptions, yet even to those very conceptions, to those subjective phenomena, as states of mind, time is essential. _Whence our Idea of Time._--It is with the idea of time as with that of space. _Logically_, time is the condition, à priori, of all experience, because of all continuous existence and all consciousness; but _chronologically_ it is à posteriori, _i. e._, it is, to us, a matter of sensible experience. Sense is the occasion on which the idea of time is first awakened in our minds. We first exist, continue to exist, are conscious of that existence, conscious of succession, thoughts, feelings, sensations, and so we get the idea of time. Time is necessary to _succession_; yet had there been no succession known to us, we should have had no _idea_ of time. We are to distinguish, of course, between our _idea_ of time and the thing itself. Locke is incorrect in making the idea of succession prior to that of duration, _in itself considered_, and not merely as regards our knowledge. In this respect, Cousin has ably and justly criticised the philosophy of Locke.