_Universally prevalent._--When we direct our attention to any given instance of the voluntary action of any intelligent rational being, we find ourselves not unfrequently pronouncing upon its character as a _right_ or _wrong_ act. Especially is this the case when the act contemplated is of a marked and unusual character. The question at once arises, is it right? Or, it may be, without the consciousness of even a question respecting it, our decision follows instantly upon the mental apprehension of the act itself--this thing is right, that thing is wrong. Our decision may be correct or incorrect; our perception of the real nature of the act may be clear or obscure; it may make a stronger or weaker impression on the mind, according to our mental habits, the tone of our mental nature, and the degree to which we have cultivated the moral faculty. There may be minds so degraded, and natures so perverted, that the moral character of an act shall be quite mistaken, or quite overlooked in many cases; or, when perceived, it shall make little impression on them. Even in such minds, however, the _idea_ of right and wrong still finds a place, and the understanding applies it, though not perhaps always correctly, to particular instances of human conduct. There is no reason to believe that any mind possessing ordinary endowments, that degree of reason and intelligence which nature usually bestows, is destitute of this idea, or fails altogether to apply it to its own acts, and those of others. _The Question and its different Answers._--But here an important question presents itself: _Whence come_ these ideas and perceptions; their origin? How is it, why is it, that we pronounce an act right or wrong, when once fairly apprehended? How come we by these notions? The fact is admitted; the explanations vary. By one class of writers our ideas of this nature have been ascribed to _education_ and _fashion_; by another, to _legal restriction_, human or divine. Others, again, viewing these ideas as the offspring of nature, have assigned them either to the operation of a _special sense_, given for this specific purpose, as the eye for vision; or to the joint action of certain associated emotions; while others regard them as originating in an exercise of _judgment_, and others still, as _natural intuitions_ of the mind, or reason exercised on subjects of a moral nature. _Main Question._--The main question is, are these ideas _natural_, or _artificial and acquired_? If the latter, are they the result of education, or of legal restraint? If the former, are they to be referred to the _sensibilities_, as the result of a special sense or of association, or to the _intellect_, as the result of the faculty of judgment or as intuitions of reason?