Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
_What Evidence of Correctness._--How are we to know, then, whether
conscience judges right? What voucher have we for its correctness?
How far is it to be trusted in its perceptions and decisions? Perhaps
we are so constituted, it may be said, as invariably to judge that to
be right which is wrong, and the reverse, and so to approve where we
should condemn. True, we reply, this may be so. It may be that I am so
constituted, that two and two shall _seem_ to be four, when in reality
they are five; and that the three angles of a triangle shall _seem_ to
be equal to two right angles, when in reality they are equal to three.
This may be so. Still it is a presumption in favor of the correctness
of all our natural perceptions, that they are the operation of original
principles of our constitution. It is not probable, to say the least,
that we are so constituted by the great Author of our being, as to be
habitually deceived. It may be that the organs of vision and hearing
are absolutely false; that the things which we see, and hear, and
feel, through the medium of the senses, have no correspondence to our
supposed perceptions. But this is not a probable supposition. He who
denies the validity of the natural faculties, has the burden of proof;
and proof is of course impossible; for the simple reason, that, in
order to prove them false, you must make use of these very faculties;
and if their testimony is not reliable in the one case, certainly it
is not in the other. We must then take their veracity for granted; and
we have the right to do so. And so of our moral nature. It comes from
the Author of our being, and if it is uniformly and originally wrong,
then he is wrong. It is an error, which, in the nature of the case, can
never be detected or corrected. We cannot get beyond our constitution,
back of our natural endowments, to judge, _à priori_, and from an
external position, whether they are correct or not. Right and wrong are
not, indeed, the creations of the divine will; but the faculties by
which we perceive and approve the right, and condemn the wrong, are
from him; and we must presume upon their general correctness.
_Not infallible._--It does not follow from this, however, nor do we
affirm, that conscience is infallible, that she never errs. It does
not follow that our moral perceptions and judgments are invariably
correct, because they spring from our native constitution. This is not
so. There is not one of the faculties of the human mind that is not
liable to err. Not one of its activities is infallible. The reasoning
power sometimes errs; the judgment errs; the memory errs. The moral
faculty is on the same footing, in this respect, with any and all other
faculties.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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