Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
But there is no reason to suppose that such a process takes place with
the brute. We have no evidence of any thing more, in his case, than the
recurrence of the associated conception or sensation, along with the
recurrence of the object which formerly produced it. Given, the object
_a_, accompanied with surrounding objects _b, c, d_, and there is
produced a given sensation, _y_. Given, again, at some subsequent time,
the same object _a_, or any one of the associate objects _b, c, d_, and
there is at once awakened a lively conception of the same sensation _y_.
_Summary of Results._--This is, I think, all we can, with any
certainty, attribute to the brute. He has sensations, and so far as
mere sense is concerned, perceptions of objects, as connected with
those sensations, but not perception in the true sense as involving
intellectual apprehension. These sensations and confused perceptions
recur, perhaps, as images or conceptions, in the absence of the
objects that gave rise to them, and as thus reappearing, constitute
what we may call the memory of the brute; but not, as with us, a
memory which connects the object or event with his own former history,
and the idea of a personal self as the percipient. Let the object,
however, reappear, and the previous sensation associated therewith, is
reawakened.
This, I am aware, is not the view most commonly entertained of brute
intelligence. We naturally conceive of the brute as possessing
faculties similar to our own. The brute, in turn, were he capable
of forming such a conception, would, probably, conceive of man, as
endowed with capacities like his own. In neither case is this the right
conception.
CHAPTER II.
MIND AS AFFECTED BY CERTAIN STATES OF THE BRAIN AND NERVOUS SYSTEM.
_Statement._--There are certain mental phenomena connected with the
relation which the mind sustains to the nervous organism, and depending
intimately on the state of that organism, which seem to require the
notice of the psychologist, though often overlooked by him; I refer
to the phenomena of sleep, dreams, somnambulism, and insanity. So far
as the activity of the mind is involved in these states or phenomena,
they become proper objects of psychological inquiry. They present
many problems difficult of solution, yet not the less curious and
interesting, as phases of mental activity hitherto little understood.
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