Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will — John Shaqi
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and WillHaven, Joseph
Philosophy
Mental Philosophy: Including the Intellect, Sensibilities, and Will
Haven, Joseph
Psychology
_Power of Sound over the Mind._--The power of sound to affect the mind,
and especially the feelings, is too well known to require specific
statement. The note of an instrument, the tone of a human voice, the
wild warbling of a bird, the tinkling of a bell, the variations of
speech and of song, from the high and shrill to the low and heavy
intonation, from the quick and impetuous to the slow and plaintive
movement, these simple varieties of tone affect powerfully the heart,
and find their way at once and irresistibly to the feelings. Hence
the power of music over even the uncultivated mind; hence too in no
small degree the power of the skilful orator over the feelings of
his audience. It is not merely, nor so much, the thing said, in many
cases, as the way of saying it, that touches and sways the assembled
multitude. Tones and sounds have a natural meaning. They are the
natural language of the heart. They express emotion, and hence awaken
emotions in others.
_The Question as to Sight._--Turning now from the sense of _hearing_
to that of _sight_, the question arises, What is it precisely that
we perceive by the eye? When we fix the eye upon any object, more or
less remote, what is it, strictly speaking, that we see, extension and
figure, or only color? Is it by vision that we learn primarily the
distance of objects and their locality? These are points requiring
investigation.
_Does Sight give Extension and Figure._--As to the first of these
questions, whether extension and figure are objects of direct visual
perception. No doubt they are associated in our minds with the act of
vision, so that the moment we see an object we obtain an idea of it
as extended, and of such and such dimensions and figure. The question
is, whether it is really through the sense of sight that we obtain
this idea, or in some other way. Had we no other means of information,
would sight alone give us this? When we first open our eyes on external
objects, do we receive the idea of extension and figure, or only of
color? The fact that as matters are, we cannot in our experience
separate the notion of some surface extension from the sensation of
color, is not decisive of these questions. We cannot, as Dr. Brown
observes, separate the color from the convexity and magnitude of an
oak before us, but this does not prove that convexity and magnitude
are objects of immediate and original perception. If every surface in
nature had been convex, suggests the same writer, we should probably
have found the same difficulty in attempting to conceive of color as
separate from convexity, that we now find in attempting to conceive
of it as separate from length and breadth. As it is, however, our
sensation of color has not always been associated with convexity, while
it has been always associated with surface extension. Hence it is,
he maintains, that we seem to perceive, by the eye, the length, and
breadth, and objects along with their color.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
Reviews
Reviews
No reviews yet
Be the first to share your thoughts on this work.
Join the Discussion
Join the discussion
Sign in to leave a comment or review.
Sign InorCreate an account