Merchantmen-at-arms : the British merchants' service in the war — John Shaqi
Merchantmen-at-arms : the British merchants' service in the warBone, David W. (David William)
History
Merchantmen-at-arms : the British merchants' service in the war
Bone, David W. (David William)
Merchant marine -- Great Britain; World War, 1914-1918 -- Naval operations
Only our tremendous resources, the sound
ability of our mercantile superintendents, the industry of the
contractors and quay staffs, brought order out of chaos and placed the
vessels in condition for service at disposal of the Admiralty.
Despite all blunders and vacillations our expedition was not unworthy of
the emergency. How much better we could have done had there been a
considered scheme of competent control must ever remain a conjecture.
Four years of war practice have improved on the hasty measures with
which we met the first immediate call. Sea-transport of troops and
munitions of war has become a highly specialized business for naval
directorate and mercantile executant alike. Ripe experience in the
thundering years has sweetened our relations. The naval transport
officer has learnt his trade. He is better served. He has now an
adequate executant staff, recruited largely from the Merchants' Service.
With liberal assistance he relies less on telegraph and telephone to
advance his work: our atmosphere is no longer polluted by the miasma of
indecision, and by the chill airs of the barracks.
Of our Naval War Staff, the transport officer was the first on the
field, but his duties were only concerned with ships requisitioned for
semi-naval service. For long we had no national assistance in our purely
commercial seafaring. Our sea-rulers (if they existed) were unconcerned
with the judicious employment of mercantile tonnage: some of our finest
liners were swinging the tides in harbour, rusting at their
cables--serving as prison hulks for interned enemies. Our service on the
sea was as lightly held. We made our voyages as in peace-time. We had no
means of communication with the naval ships at sea other than the
universally understood International Code of Signals. Any measures we
took to keep out of the way of enemy war vessels, then abroad, were our
own. We had no Intelligence Service to advise us in our choice of
sea-routes, and act as distributors of confidential information. We were
far too 'jack-easy' in our seafaring: we estimated the enemy's sea-power
over-lightly.
Public-domain text, read in full here on John Shaqi.
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