To effect such rapid marches as he had determined upon, it was necessary that the soldiery should make up their minds to consider tents and baggage as idle luxuries; and that instead of a long and complicated chain of reserves and stores, they should dare to rely wholly for the means of sustenance on the countries into which their venturesome leader might conduct them. The objects of Napoleon's expedition were to compel the king of Sardinia, who maintained a powerful army in the field, to abandon the alliance of Austria; to compel Austria to concentrate her forces in her Italian provinces, thus obliging her to withdraw them from the bank of the Rhine where they had long hovered. It was hoped, also, to humble the power of the Vatican and break the prestige of its Jesuitical diplomacy forever. He had as yet achieved no fame in the field and not a general in Europe would have blamed him if he had only succeeded in holding the territory of Nice and Savoy, which France had already won. Napoleon's plan of reaching the fair regions of Italy differed from that of all former conquerors; they had uniformly penetrated the Alps at some point of access in that mighty range of mountains; he judged that the same end might be accomplished more easily by advancing along the narrow strip of comparatively level country that intervenes between those enormous barriers and the shores of the Mediterranean Sea, and forcing a passage at the point where the last or southern extremity of the Alps melt, as it were, into the first and lowest of the Appenine range. No sooner did he begin to concentrate his troops towards this region than Beaulieu, the Austrian general, took measures for protecting Genoa and the entrance of Italy with a powerful, disciplined and well-appointed army. He posted himself with one column at Voltri, a town on the sea some ten miles west of Genoa; D'Argenteau, with another column occupied the heights of Montenotte, while the Sardinians, led by General Colli, formed the right of the line at Ceva. This disposition was made in compliance with the old system of tactics; but it was powerless before new strategy. The French could not advance towards Genoa but by confronting some one of the three armies and these Beaulieu supposed were too strongly posted to be dislodged. On the morning of the 12th of April, 1796, when D'Argenteau advanced from Montenotte to attack the column of Rampon, he found that by skillful manoeuvres during the night Napoleon had completely surrounded him--a man who had fancied there was nothing new to be done in warfare.