At two P.M. on the day of the battle--viz., at the time our troops turned out to attack, the cavalry and artillery had just arrived, much jaded after their long march, and the infantry brigades had not all arrived, but received their orders whilst on the line of march, to hasten forward with all possible speed, and take up their posts on the field of action. On riding over the ground, some time after the action was fought, it appeared to me that the fortified village of Moodkee would have afforded an admirable position to be occupied by such portion of the wearied infantry and artillery, as had arrived on the ground; and their numbers would have been concealed from the enemy. This would have afforded them rest, and water, of which there was an abundance around the village; and our cavalry pickets, falling back, would have drawn the enemy most probably upon the open ground, which he had then nearly reached; and, being emboldened by perceiving few of the British forces, and those not advancing, is it not reasonable to conclude that he would have become the assailant? Had the Sikhs attacked us while so posted, the force in Moodkee might have engaged the attention of the enemy, whilst our cavalry and rear brigades of infantry, by making a trifling detour in the jungle, would have taken the Sikh forces in reverse, and probably given them more cause to regret their advance from Ferozeshuhur than as matters actually befel. Had the Sikhs not attacked when our cavalry pickets retired upon Moodkee, our forces would have been fresh, and better prepared for action the following morning; and the 19th of December ought to have yielded more favourable results, under such circumstances, than the 18th. Taking, as a third supposition, that the Sikh force would have fallen back during the night on their main column at Ferozeshuhur, the conclusion is, that there would have been no battle of Moodkee, and that Ferozeshuhur might have been fought on the 20th, in lieu of the 21st and 22nd of December, in neither of which cases can I see any ground for supposing that our interests would have suffered. I have heard it suggested, that if the enemy had not been engaged at Moodkee, there was a probability of his turning our flank, and threatening the provinces; if such had been his intention, it is probable that he would have taken another line of country, and not the road by which our forces were advancing, for the country affords anywhere a ready passage for troops, and they are not confined to any particular track, as in inclosed countries. RETURN OF KILLED AND WOUNDED IN THE ACTION OF MOODKEE, DEC. 18, 1845.